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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, I study how the Marine Corps is developing and selecting leaders 
who will promote innovation and success in the future battlefields. Several studies 
have analyzed the effects of graduate education and the factors associated with 
selection for promotion and command selection, but none have separated the 
Graduate Education Program (GEP) into areas of training and education. Prior 
research shows that Marine officers with non-professional military education (non-
PME) graduate degrees (taught how to think) have lower performance, retention, and 
promotion rates than Marines at the same career point who attend a PME course (taught 
what to think). Since the institution of the Commandant’s Career-Level Education 
Board and Commandant’s Professional Intermediate-Level Education Board in 2011, 
the Marine Corps has redirected its best and brightest to attend a graduate-level 
institution. In this thesis, I use both quantitative and qualitative data to examine 
how GEP participation affects selection on the lieutenant colonel (LtCol) command 
screening board. I find that the timing of a Marine’s attendance to PME and non-
PME GEPs is highly correlated to LtCol command selection, but does not currently 
predict command performance. Finally, I deduce that the Industrial Age model of 
education currently utilized by the Marine Corps will be ineffective in developing 
the interdisciplinary critical thinkers that will be needed for success in 21st century 
warfare. 
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The Marine Corps is on a crash course with 21st century warfare. In 2018, the 
Department of the Navy released Education for Seapower that “suggested that there is a 
disconnect between what education provides for a thinking, learning, and adapting Navy and 
Marine Corps, and how the naval culture of the twenty-first-century views education … 
today’s Navy and Marine Corps tend to see education as a ‘check-in the block’ on an Industrial 
Age path” (Modly, 2018). This suggests that the Marine Corps might be developing inflexible, 
risk-adverse leaders who will fail to meet the demands of a future battlefield consisting of 
artificial intelligence, great power competition, and hybrid warfare. This thesis examines the 
need for the Marine Corps to transition from an Industrial Age learning model to an 
Informational Age learning model such that future leaders are educated to embrace and 
flourish in uncertain and wicked environments. 
Lieutenant colonel command is customarily the highlight in a Marine officer’s 20-
year career. This billet offers the opportunity to influence not only the organization but more 
importantly the Marines within their charge. As such, these commanders are instrumental in 
developing the future leaders of the Marine Corps and instilling a bias for action and thirst for 
lifelong learning.  
Established in 1992, the Command Screening Program (CSP) seeks to identify and 
select the most qualified lieutenant colonels and colonels for command. This board replaced 
the previous method that involved Commanding Generals at every level of command, 
selecting the commanders for their respective subordinate commands (Marr, 1997). The 
updated Command Screening Board (CSB) aimed at combating the biases created by 
Commanding Generals playing favorites or dismissing smaller military occupational 
specialties (MOS) (National Naval Officer’ Association, 2008). I choose only to focus on the 
lieutenant colonel CSB to better understand a Marine’s first chance for command selection. 
While little has changed regarding the CSP, the latest Marine Corps Order (MCO 1364B), 
published in 2017, maintains the mission of providing “our Marines with the best and most 
fully qualified commanders in order to maintain a competent and well-balanced fighting 
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force” (Headquarters Marine Corps, 2017). What has not been addressed in the CSP is 
whether we are selecting Marine Officers who know how to think rather than what to think. 
My thesis work analyzes the CSP selection of Marine Corps Officers for lieutenant 
colonel command. Using data from fiscal year 2015-2019 lieutenant colonel CSBs, I test for 
the variables that are significant in affecting selection. In addition, I examine whether the 
selected leaders are well suited for the complexities of 21st century warfare. To answer my 
research questions, I organize my thesis into two parts: a quantitative data analysis and a 
qualitative synthesis of books, academic research, and military doctrine. 
This dataset I use in the quantitative part of the research is obtained from Tarsiuk 
(2019) and it includes data on 2,838 screened Marine officers. The data are compiled from 
three sources: personnel data from Total Force Data Warehouse, CSB results from Manpower 
Management Officer Assignments-3, and fitness report data from manpower management 
records. I use multivariate regression models in my analysis to find that the timing of a 
Marine’s attendance to Professional Military Education (PME) (i.e., Expeditionary Warfare 
School, Captain’s Career Course, Command and Staff Colleges) and non-PME (i.e., Naval 
Postgraduate School, Air Force Institute of Technology) Graduate Education Programs (GEP) 
is highly correlated to lieutenant colonel command selection but it does not currently predict 
command performance. Marines who attended a non-PME GEP are less likely to be selected 
for command than those who attended a PME or no GEP at all. However, Marines who attend 
non-PME graduate education as a major are, on average, less likely to be selected than 
captains. This is most likely due to the inability of these Marines to get back to their primary 
MOS prior to being screened on the CSB. Another explanation is that Marines who attend 
non-PME GEPs as captains have enough time in their career to reestablish their MOS 
credibility and remain competitive for lieutenant colonel command.  
Based on my findings, I conclude that attending a GEP is not a “career killer” for 
Marines who want to be lieutenant colonel commanders. What is important to understand is 
that the timing of a Marine’s attendance to a GEP is what affects their odds of command 
selection. I also conclude that attending a PME or non-PME course does not significantly 
affect a commander’s performance. This is important to highlight because the assumption that 
Marines are not being selected because they attended a non-PME GEP is unfounded. This 
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finding, while beneficial to Marine commanders, does not take into account the future of 21st 
century warfare; only previous counter-insurgency experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
Syria are included. It will be advantageous to track this model though the great power 
competition with China and Russia to determine if advantages for commanders with “range” 
increase in this domain. 
In the qualitative analysis part of the thesis, I find that the Industrial Age model of 
education currently utilized by the Marine Corps will be insufficient in developing the 
interdisciplinary critical thinkers that will be needed for success in 21st century warfare. While 
the release of MCDP 7 Learning and MCDP 1-4 Competing has reemphasized a focus of 
education, the Marine Corps is still operating on an Industrial Age learning model that is over-
reliant on doctrine, standard operating procedures, and memorization. While this model is 
efficient and effective in tame environments, they fall short in the complexities of a wicked 
battlefield. By specializing our way of learning and thinking, we have installed filters to help 
us focus, but at a significant cost. By filtering issues, we have essentially ignored other 
concerns and possibly missed critical opportunities. 
Commanders who are educated to embrace interdisciplinary thinking, respectful 
dissent/playing devil’s advocate, and view failure as an opportunity to learn not only create 
better problem solvers but also promote and develop more innovative and creative thinkers 
within their command. As stated by Adler in his book Reforming Education: The Opening of 
the American Mind,  
the very best thing that our educational institutions can do, so far as general 
education (not the training of specialists), is to afford preparation for continued 
learning by their students after the leave these institutions behind them. That 
cannot be done unless the skills of learning are cultivated in school and unless, 
in schools and colleges, the students are initiated into the understanding of 
great ideas and issues and are motivated to continue to seek an ever-increasing 
understanding of them. (Adler, 1990) 
It is from these conclusions that we offer recommendations to aid in the implantation and 
adoption of “range” to the Marine Corps. 
While this thesis is limited in scope, it establishes a starting point for future studies 
regarding education versus training in talent management. I suggest further studies examine 
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how the Commandant’s Career Level Education Board and Commandant’s Professional 
Intermediate-Level Education Board has affected lieutenant colonel promotions and CSB 
selections because Marines are no longer self-selecting themselves into these programs. 
Additionally, exploring the self-removal of eligible officers (through remove by request) 
would give a better understanding of how Marines view their experience following GEP 
attendance. 
Finally, it would be beneficial to explore the culture and organizational barriers of 
failure and respectful dissent within the Marine Corps. Countless research has determined that 
organizations typically do not suffer from a lack of innovate people, but rather from the 
structure, systems, and culture within the organization itself (Bennett & Parks, 2015). By 
exposing the benefits of failures and synthesizing the misnomer of respectful dissent, we could 
put the Marine Corps in a stronger position to reform our education models to eventually 
develop and select leaders with range. 
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Strong leaders are also teachers and mentors. Every Marine is a current or 
future leader, and therefore, leads by example to seek learning opportunities 
for themselves and other Marines. All Marines develop leadership skills and 
improve communication through continuous learning and self-reflection. 
—Department of the Navy (2020b) 
The battlefield of 21st century warfare will be shrouded in uncertainty. Artificial 
intelligence, decentralized operations, and constant ambiguity will become the new 
environment in which we must function. While overwhelming, we cannot afford our 
leaders to overuse experts and allow their sense of thinking to atrophy. To maintain 
relevance and ensure domination, we must select leaders who not only thrive, but embrace 
this fog of war. These commanders also must be educators and advisors to those in their 
charge in order to perpetuate the mindset of curiosity and interdisciplinary thinking. 
Unfortunately, the current structure of professional military education (PME) 
within the United States Marine Corps (USMC) is modeled after Industrial Age education 
in which the emphasis is placed on rote memorization and standard operating procedures 
(SOPs). This process knowingly develops inflexible experts who farm out their thinking 
and limit their perspectives.  
Building on lessons learned from the adoption of maneuver warfare1 (MW) in the 
1980s and 1990s, the Marine Corps has begun a learning rebirth. A new found emphasis 
on Informational Age models of education2 is beginning to be discussed for diffusion into 
PME programs (Mullen, 2018). Additionally, the Graduate Education Program (GEP) is 
 
1 MW was nested in 1980s military reform, sparked by poor military tactics (attrition warfare) utilized 
in Vietnam. General Alfred Gray was the key leader in the development and implementation of the MW 
philosophy in the Marine Corps and is credited with developing and implementing FMFM 1 Warfighting 
and sparking a renaissance of education and learning by creating the Marine Corps University and 
Commandant’s Reading List (Augier & Barrett, 2020). 
2 Informational Age learning is the widely accepted Marine Corps description for post-Industrial Age 
learning. It can also be called cognitive age learning or judgment age learning (Augier & Barrett, 2019a). 
The term Informational Age learning was first used in the Marine Corps by Major General William Mullen 
in his Commander’s Guidance as Commanding General for Training and Education Command. The term 
was then adopted by General David Berger in his Commandant’s Planning Guidance. 
2 
gaining popularity again and the Marine Corps is now emphasizing non-PME programs 
(Naval Postgraduate School [NPS]).  
While the Marine Corps appears to be trending in the direction of developing and 
accepting leaders with more “range”3 (Neller, 2018), there maintains a stigma against non-
PME programs. This stereotype is due to their effect of reduced time within a Marine’s 
military occupational specialty (MOS) and association with an inability to command those 
units at a higher level (Tarsiuk, 2019). In this thesis, I provide a systemic analysis of the 
effect of GEP attendance (PME and non-PME) on Lieutenant Colonel (LtCol) Command 
Selection Board and explore if participation in current PME or non-PME courses have the 
potential to develop effective 21st century commanders.  
A. BACKGROUND 
1. Lieutenant Colonel Command Selection Board 
Established in 1992, the Command Screening Program (CSP) seeks to identify and 
select the most qualified LtCols and Colonels (Cols) for command. This board replaced the 
previous method which involved Commanding Generals at every-level of command 
selecting the commanders for their respective subordinate commands (Marr, 1997). The 
updated Command Screening Board (CSB) aimed at combating the biased created by 
Commanding Generals playing favorites or dismissing smaller MOSs (National Naval 
Officer’ Association, 2008). I am choosing only to focus on the LtCol CSB, as mentioned 
previously, to better understand a Marine’s first chance for command selection. While little 
has changed regarding the CSP the latest Marine Corps Order (MCO), 1364B, was 
published in 2017 and maintains the mission of providing “our Marines with the best and 
most fully qualified commanders in order to maintain a competent and well-balanced 
fighting force” (Headquarters Marine Corps, 2017). 
 
3 General Neller stated in the 2019 LtCol CSB Precept, that the Marine Corps does not have a 
“preferred career pattern for officers” and board members should “consider that the Marine Corps benefits 
when the officer corps possesses a broad spectrum of experiences.” This accumulation of perspectives and 
education is the very definition of an individual with range. 
3 
2. Graduate Education Program 
Revised in 2019 and replacing the previously named the Special Education Board 
(SEP), the GEP seeks to annually select officers who meet the qualifications to partake in 
postgraduate programs (Headquarters Marine Corps, 2019b). The GEP has been refined 
over the years, but the major shift took place in 2011 with the establishment of the 
Commandant’s Career Level Education Board (CCLEB) and Commandant’s Professional 
Intermediate-Level Education Board (CPIB). This created non-volunteer selectees for 
placement in graduate-level education. These boards were implemented to combat the low 
participation rate (80%) of Marines (U.S. Marine Corps, 2020) and increase the quality of 
students selected for the GEP.  
Further refinement was needed within the GEP as Marine’s career timing was not 
initially considered, which resulted in Marines missing key billets-in-grade and negatively 
affecting their chances of promotion and command selection. This was corrected in 2013 
when Manpower Management Officer Assignments (MMOA)-3 began to thoroughly scrub 
board selectees for career timing considerations. Additionally, in 2016, it became 
mandatory for Marines to submit college and post-graduate transcripts and fill-out a 
preliminary questionnaire regarding GEP preference (Figure 1). Finally, in 2017, the 
selection and slating boards were combined and graduate-level education programs were 
slated before resident PME schools (Figure 2). This most recent adjustment indicates a 
cultural shift in the Marine Corps regarding the importance of education (NPS) more than 
training (resident PME schools).  
4 
 
Figure 1. History of the Commandant’s Education Board. Source: U.S. 
Marine Corps (2020) 
 
Figure 2. Commandant’s Education Board Mechanics. Source: U.S. Marine 
Corps (2020). 
5 
3. Marine Corps’ Reemphasis on Education 
General Alfred M. Gray Jr., 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps, is responsible 
for refocusing the Marine Corps towards the importance of education. He established the 
Marine Corps University in 1989 and successfully provided “unity of effort to how we 
educate our Corps’ most important asset and our lifeblood - our people” (Bowers, 2017). 
While this was an important first step in shifting the Marine Corps’ focus toward education, 
it unfortunately has been diluted by decades of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, leading to the 
institutionalization of PME within the Marine Corps (Mullen, 2020). This “cooling effect” 
has been detrimental in the continuation of learning within in these “hot groups”4 that were 
facilitated and nurtured by General Gray (Augier & Barrett, 2020). These hot groups 
contributed to the grassroots movement that facilitated the Marines Corps’ adoption of 
MW. This perspective on organizational change (hot groups) was a driving factor in the 
innovation diffusion5 of learning within the Marine Corps. Unfortunately, the growth of 
organizational structure and rules has inhibited the innovation and continuation of these 
hot groups and Marines are now primarily taught what to think and not how to think. 
This issue came to light in the Education for Seapower (E4S) when the Department 
of the Navy “suggested that there is a disconnect between what education provides for a 
thinking, learning, and adapting Navy and Marine Corps, and how the naval culture of the 
twenty-first-century views education…today’s Navy and Marine Corps tend to see 
education as a ‘check-in the block’ on an Industrial Age path” (Modly, 2018). This idea of 
a stagnate education system led the Marine Corps to take a closer look at why and how we 
educate.  
The recent refocus on the diffusion of learning and education within the Marine 
Corps can be attributed to the Commanding General’s Guidance from Training and 
 
4 A hot group is a term first published by Harold Leavitt (a psychologist and professor of 
management) in 1996 to describe how movements can form, spread, and transform organizations. Augier 
and Barret utilize this term to characterize the grassroots network of young Marines who were responsible 
for the cultural change within the Marine Corps regarding the adoption of MW. 
5 Everett Roger was a communication theorist and sociologist who research established the theory of 
innovation diffusion and coined the term “early adopter.” His categorization of innovation adopters helped 
managers and businesses understand the impact of “people differences” on predicting and managing 
diffusion of products or services. 
6 
Education Command. Taking command of Training and Education Command (TECOM) 
in 2018, Major General Mullen outlined his vision for TECOM by proposing several 
changes to the model in which we train and educate Marines. He identified the 
shortcomings of the Industrial Age model in Marine Crops PME courses and the need for 
a diffusion of a more diverse education process that prepares Marines for the unknown. His 
guidance also highlighted that “training prepares you to deal with the known in combat, 
education prepares you to deal with the unknown” (Mullen, 2018). 
In the 2019 Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG), General Berger stated that 
“there is an increasing dissonance between what we are doing with regard to training and 
education, and what we need to be doing” (Office of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, 
2019). He goes on to emphasize that memorization of facts will not serve the Marine Corps 
in the next great power competition because we will be fighting a war that is too complex 
and distributed to simply execute off of memory. He goes on to say that “resourcing a real 
‘campaign of learning’ presents challenges. Further guidance on resourcing will follow, 
but deliberate service-level O-6 and O-5 talent management, permeant manning 
adjustments, fiscal reprogramming, and the temporary allocation of highly-qualified 
manpower from the MCU student population, are all elements of a likely solution for 
proper resourcing of this critical effort” (Office of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, 
2019).  
Just recently the Marine Corps released the first Marine Corps Doctrinal 
Publication (MCDP) since 2001. The purpose of MCDP 7 Learning is to diffuse the Marine 
Corps’ philosophy on education and explain why it is important. In the forward, General 
Berger states that “continuous learning is essential to maneuver warfare because it enables 
Marines to quickly recognize changing conditions in the battlespace, adapt, and make 
timely decisions against a thinking enemy” (Department of the Navy, 2020b). This is an 
important first step in refocusing the Marine Corps on how to think and not what to think.  
B. PURPOSE AND INTENT 
The Marine Corps’ greatest assets are the Marines within it and as such, the Marine 
Corps only selects the “highest qualified” Marines to lead them. The purpose of the LtCol 
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CSB “is to ensure that Marines receive the best possible leadership and to provide all 
eligible officers with a fair and equitable opportunity to command” (Headquarters Marine 
Corps, 2019a). This sounds admirable, but there has been a long-standing assumption in 
the Marine Corps that one’s MOS credibility (or specialization) is vital to selection on the 
LtCol CSB. This assumption has been highlighted by the E4S which concluded that 
“today’s naval professionals see themselves as members of tribes within the naval sphere, 
as opposed to actually identifying as naval professionals. Officers self-identify as Naval 
Aviators, Surface Warfare Officers, Submariners, SEALs or Marine Infantry, etc., focusing 
inward on their tactical and procedural specialty” (Modly, 2018). This issue creates a 
problem for Marines who are selected to participate in the GEP, formerly the SEP, because 
they are being forced to operate for years outside their primary military occupational 
specialty (PMOS). Thus, in my thesis, I use Marine data from the Total Force Data 
Warehouse (TFDW) and MMOA-3 to examine the following research questions: 
1. How does the Selection for Command outcome differ, if at all, for Marines 
who participate in PME and non-PME GEPs? 
2. Does participation in current PME or non-PME courses have the potential 
to develop future O-5 commanders who stimulate innovation and 
flexibility in future battlefields? 
I conduct a quantitative analysis of the fiscal year 2015 (FY15) to FY19 CSB 
through the use of a multivariate regression analysis to attempt to explain the effect of 
MOS credibility (through attending a GEP) on selection on the CSB. The GEP career path 
is broken into four variables; Captain PME (O-3 level PME attendance), Major PME (O-4 
level PME attendance), Captain Non-PME (NPS, Air Force Institute of technology [AFIT], 
and other civilian graduate-level education programs that remove Marines from their 
primary MOS for an extended period of time) and Major Non-PME. I then estimate probit 
or logit models to predict CSB selection by controlling for various predictors (gender, 
deployments, awards, time in service, etc.). Then, I construct an odds ratio to determine if 
there is a statistical difference in LtCol command selection based on a Marine attending a 
PME or non-PME GEP. I conclude that attending a GEP is not a “career killer” for Marines 
who want to be LtCol commanders, but the timing of a Marine’s attendance to a GEP is 
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what effects their odds of command selection. Additionally, I conclude that attending a 
PME or non-PME course does not significantly affect a commander’s performance. 
I also conduct a qualitative analysis that attempts to determine the ideal commander 
that the Marine Corps should be selecting to operate in the 21st century battlefield. This 
analysis is an examination of recent literature (books, academic journal articles, and 
military doctrine) regarding interdisciplinary thinking, industrial versus information 
learning, and wicked versus tame environments. Finally, I attempt to illustrate differences 
between industrial and Informational Age learning, through another perspective on 
organizational change by Everett Rogers, and recommend actions to generate the 
innovation diffusion of the “process” (learning and education) within Marine Corps PME. 
From the qualitative portion of this thesis, I conclude that commanders who are educated 
to embrace interdisciplinary-thinking, respectfully dissent/play devil’s advocate, and view 
failure as an opportunity to learn not only create better problem-solvers, but promote and 
develop more innovative and creative thinkers within their command. 
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
I organize this thesis into five chapters. Chapter I provides the background and 
detailed description of the GEP, CSP, and the Marine Corps’ re-emphasis on education. It 
also is an introduction to the thesis and its significance to the Marine Corps. Chapter II is 
a review of the literature that examines past military and academic research in these areas. 
Chapter III defines the data sources, variables, and multivariate models used in the analysis. 
Chapter IV is the analysis, findings, and interpretations. Chapter V closes the thesis with a 
discussion of the thesis’ recommendations, limitations, and areas for further study.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review focuses on a select group of NPS theses that create a base 
knowledge of GEP selection and indicator variables for “successful” Marine officers. The 
academic research focuses on two selected works that offer a different perspective on 
leadership and problem solving through the synthesis of prior establish academic research.  
There is significant literature on factors that influence selection on LtCol promotion 
and CSBs. Most of the studies look at determining the factors associated with being 
selected for command; demographic characteristics, such as race, PMOS, awards, fitness, 
marksmanship. However, no previous research has examined the differentiated effect of 
training (MOS credibility) versus education (attendance at NPS or non-PME schools) on 
selection for LtCol command. My research attempts to shed light on the assumption of 
non-PME attendance being a “career-killer” and detrimental to developing future leaders.  
A. MILITARY RESEARCH 
1. Lianez and Zamarripa (2003) 
Lianez and Zamarripa (2003) study the effect of the Marine Corps’ GEPs on officer 
performance. Their goal was to provide data to confirm or deny the Marine Corps’ 
assumption that PME (Command and Staff Colleges [CSCs]) is responsible for an increase 
in officer performance over the alternative attendance to a Non-PME graduate education 
(NPS). They derived a performance index from fitness report (FITREP) data and averaged 
before- and after- markings of officers who attended PME, Non-PME, and no graduate 
education (NOS). Multivariate regressions (holding affective [Officer Candidate School, 
Reserve Officers’ Training Cops, Prior Service, etc.], cognitive [General Classification 
Test and The Basic School (TBS) performance], and demographic variables constant) 
found that the performance of Marine officers with any form of graduate education was 
not appreciably distinctive from that of Marine officers who did not obtain a graduate 
education. While the difference of pre- and post- education performance is not notably 
dissimilar for those Marine officers who attended a graduate school and those who did not, 
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the performance of those who attended a non-PME graduate education was slightly smaller 
than those without any graduate education (significant at the 0.10 level). This could 
indicate that attending a GEP program negatively affects MOS credibility and lowers 
FITREP markings. A major limitation of the Lianez and Zamarripa (2003) study is that it 
only analyzed four years (FY1999 through FY2002) of data and the long-term effects of 
graduate education on officer performance were, therefore, not estimated. 
2. Rateike (2017) 
Rateike (2017) conducts a quantitative analysis of officer selection by the CCLEB. 
He uses CCLEB data (MMOA-3) from FY2014 through FY2016 that is merged with data 
from TFDW, TBS, and Manpower Management Records and Performance (MMRP). His 
research finds that the CCLEB places considerable weight on job performance (measured 
from FITREPs), seniority (years of commissioned service), and including a recent picture 
in the application (which he associated with motivation). His results also indicate that TSB 
scores (most notability, academic and leadership) are an accurate predictor of selection. A 
limitation of using the findings from the Rateike (2017) study is that the CCLEB underwent 
a massive restructuring in FY2017 (adding transcripts and questionnaires before the board 
meeting). The data analyzed is only relevant to explaining the prior process of the CCLEB. 
Also, the FITREP data did not include the Section I comments which form a word picture 
of the Marine and their future potential. It is quite common for quantitative markings in 
other sections to not match the Section I comments, but the briefers on the CCLEB have 
access to all data and these comments could alter their assessment of the Marine. In 
addition, no differentiation between types of college degree or any form of education was 
used. It would be interesting to see if science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) 
degrees increase the probability of selection for CCLEB since they are highly encouraged 
for admittance into NPS. The main take away from the Rateike study is that MOS 
credibility (called job performance in his thesis) is a predictor of CCLEB selection and a 
trait that is associated with a “high-quality” Marine Corps officer. This supports the 
assumption in this thesis that MOS credibility is associated with performance (derived from 
FITREPs) and increases when Marines remain within their occupational field. 
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3. Branigan (2001) 
Branigan (2001) analyzes the factors associated with retention and promotion to O-
5, with a specific focus on economic returns to graduate education (NPS). He uses data 
from FY1998 to FY2001 LtCol promotion boards in conjunction with linear regression 
analysis and probit models to predict retention and promotion of Marine Corps officers. He 
concludes that a graduate degree from NPS, along with other master’s degree awarding 
institutions, has a positive effect on retention and promotion. He uses several techniques to 
correct for potential bias due to self-selection and sample-selection, but the results from 
these techniques were too sensitive and inconclusive. These results are interesting because 
this study takes place long before the CCLEB and CPIB, therefore, all Marines with 
degrees from NPS were volunteers and had a tendency to be seen as “selfish” and avoiding 
the Fleet Marine Force (FMF). Also, the effect on graduate degrees from an institution 
other than NPS was higher than receiving a graduate degree from NPS. This could be an 
indicator that a Master’s degree obtained through CSC or another PME school is valued 
more for retention and promotion because Marines can spend more time in their primary 
MOS and less time in utilization billets (training being viewed as superior to education). 
4. Tarsiuk (2019) 
Tarsiuk (2019) conducts a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the Marine Corps 
CSP. Using data from FY15 to FY19 LtCol CSBs, she examines the processes of the CSP, 
elements determining selection, and the effect of CSB members on the Marines being 
screened. She determines that the Marine Corps does have existing biases in the boards 
that should be mitigated. She identifies that board members value different selection 
outcomes and command types.  
Also, she recommends that boards should be more diligent in assessing a 
candidate’s character and other intangible qualities. These conclusions inspired me to 
conduct a further, more thorough analysis of career timing and the assumption that MOS 
credibility is a key factor in CSB selection. This area of concern was discussed briefly in 
Tarsiuk’s thesis, but not quantified or explored against current leadership models. 
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I utilize the CSB data to derive PME and non-PME variables and the FITREP data 
to better quantify the performance of command selected Marines and identity if PME or 
non-PME attendance has a significant effect.  
B. ACADEMIC RESEARCH 
While not academic research themselves, the following books build on scholarly 
academic research to challenge current notions regarding industrial age learning (i.e., 
creating and operating in silos). Range begins by detailing why generalists are more suited 
to succeed in a world currently dominated by experts. Think for Yourself expands upon this 
theory of high performing generalists and provides solutions to relearning the ability to 
think critically in the 21st century. I supplement the ideas highlighted in these books and 
expand on them with relevant academic literature. 
1. Range (2019) 
Impactful research has been recently referenced in the 2019 Range by David 
Epstein who offers a counterargument to Malcolm Gladwell’s Outliers: The Story of 
Success. Epstein argues, citing findings from recent and relevant scientific studies, that, 
“when you move on from an area of work or an entire domain, that experience is not 
wasted” (Epstein, 2019). He goes on to propose that this diverse experience enables 
interdisciplinary thought and empowers individuals to become more efficient and effective 
problem solvers. This paradigm goes against the common assumption that hyper-
specialization is required for success and that only repeated practice can allow one to attain 
greatness.  
This shift toward generalist advantage is supported by the research of 
psychologists, William G. Chase and Herbert A. Simon,6 who discovered that experts do 
not have photographic memories, but rather the ability to recognize patterns. This number 
of short-term information that can be immediately recalled was termed a “chunk” by 
 
6 Herbert Simon was an economist, political scientist, and cognitive psychologist who received the 
Nobel Prize in Economics in 1978. His interdisciplinary research led to theories of “bounded rationality” 
and “satisficing.” He was a pioneer in the field of artificial intelligence, decision-making, and complex 
systems.  
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George A. Miller, but Simon was able to combine two non-testable hypothesizes (the 
number chunk capable in short term recall and the time required to learn one chunk in 
seconds) one parameter-estimating paradigm. The importance of this experiment is that it 
allowed Simon to combine two separate systems (capacity for learning and time to learn) 
into one experiment. His results concluded that “the chunk capacity of short-term memory 
has been shown to be in the range of five to seven. Fixation of information in long-term 
memory has been show to take about 5 or 10 seconds per chunk” (Simon, 1974). This 
discovery explains why experts are typically only successful in one domain because they 
dedicate their lives to viewing the world through one perspective, which breeds the 
identification of these chunks when presented with a problem. 
Daniel Kahneman’s research of the heuristics and biases approach supports the 
generalist mindset by offering a distrustful attitude toward experts and their opinions.7 
Kahneman coined the term “illusion of validity for the unjustified sense of confidence that 
often comes with clinical judgement” (Kahneman & Klein, 2009). His research has 
concluded that experts make substandard choices and reach improper deductions when they 
blindly follow their intuitions. It is these situations, that experts fail to apply the rules and 
regulations with which they have utilized throughout their career. This research supports 
the claim, like Simon, that experts tend to follow pattern recognition which works in tame 
environments, but can lead to disastrous results when applied to ill-structured problems. 
Research by Herman Kahn and Irwin Mann on the common pitfalls of analysis also 
support the theory of unintended consequences by specialists. In their 1957 research 
memorandum, they explore the common mistakes made by operations analysts and systems 
analysts. One of the most frequent pitfalls and that which accurately describes the biases 
of the specialist is that of modelism. Modelism is the over utilization and mishandling of 
models in analysis. They conclude that “many analysts prefer to study only the interesting 
(to them) portions of the whole problem. They often end up by studying an irrelevant or 
 
7 In Colonel John Boyd’s (USAF, Ret.) Conceptual Spiral Presentation, he comments that there are 
three ways to offend him: call him an analyst (what he identifies as having half a brain), call him an expert 
(meaning he has everything figured out and cannot learn anything new), or call him an analytical expert 
(meaning he has half a brain and still thinks he has everything figured out). 
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overidealized question. Or what is sometimes almost as bad, the question that is being 
studied is relevant but not complete” (Kahn & Mann, 1957). Modelism can also lead to 
another mistake called over-concentration. The danger of over-concentration is “the 
factoring out of a suitable area will be done carelessly or unskillfully and an overly-narrow 
viewpoint adopted” (Kahn & Mann, 1957). This research supports the claim that specialists 
are more synonymous with hedgehogs who, when addressed with a problem, typically 
utilize their expertise and experience to dig deeper within their known domain to generate 
a perspective and solution.  
Epstein goes on to explain the concept of “learning, fast and slow” by exploring the 
research of Nate Kornell. A cognitive psychologist at Williams College, Kornell conducted 
studies investigating why U.S. students do not do well on international measures of high 
school knowledge. He determined that this phenomenon was due to a lack of “desirable 
difficulties, obstacles that make learning more challenging, slower, and more frustrating in 
the short term, but better in the long term” (Epstein, 2019). Epstein argues that students 
who learn under various conditions (called interleaved practice) are forced to recognize 
deep structural connections among various problems. This allows students to match a 
strategy with a problem and creates flexibility in one’s problem-solving abilities; enabling 
the use of structure in new domains. Unfortunately, this is not how we are currently 
teaching within the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps tends to practice block learning, 
which is the process of repetition so that you learn a procedure. This works well for 
breaking down a weapons system or programming a radio but hinders our Marine’s ability 
to make decisions in a fluid environment. 
Yale law and psychology professor Dan Kahan, has continued to explore the 
methods and effectiveness of generalists over experts. He calls this personality feature 
science curiosity because it describes individuals who choose to view new evidence, 
regardless of their current personal beliefs. These generalists are compared to foxes who 
continually try and amass information to better understand the world around them. Experts 
are better compared to hedgehogs who live in a single domain and silo their thinking to 
one system. These individuals take a very narrow view of problems they are presented with 
and typically burrow their understanding of issues into their own field of expertise.  
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This observation that experts self-inflict obstinacy is central to this thesis because 
Gladwell’s “10,000-hour rule” parallels the Marine Corps’ propaganda of MOS credibility. 
Additionally, this book separates the world into two learning environments: wicked and 
kind. Psychologist Robin Hogarth describes kind learning environments as those that 
“involve close matches between the informational elements in the two settings (learning 
and predictions) and are a necessary condition for accurate inferences” (Hogarth et al., 
2015). The defines wicked learning environments as those that involve mismatches. This 
means that kind environments follow patterns and can be easily understood, while wicked 
environments are complex and may have multiple solutions. These learning environments 
can be translated to the style of warfare that leaders will face in the 21st century. With 
increasing access to information and the rise of great power competition, the future 
battlefield is certain to be full of wicked problems. I intend to use the studies cited in this 
book and others revolving around the concept of generalists and critical thinking to explain 
that attendance to non-PME GEPs is the key to developing range and the characteristics 
needed for commanders to be successful in the uncertain and decentralized battlefield of 
21st century warfare. 
2. Think for Yourself (2020) 
In the 2020 book Think for Yourself: Restoring Common Sense in an Age of Experts 
and Artificial Intelligence, the author, Vikram Mansharamani, argues that “experts and 
technologies are useful-indeed essential-but it is the mindless and blind outsourcing to 
them that must be guarded against, that generates unnecessary risks to our well-being, and 
that limits opportunities to realize our true potential” (Mansharamani, 2020).  
This hypothesis is supported by Herbert Simon who suggested that humans suffer 
from “bounded rationality.” This means that a person’s ability to optimize is limited by 
current information available, limitations of the mind to interpret tradeoffs, and the scarcity 
of time. Simon suggests that we should “learn to satisfice” rather than maximize (Simon, 
1956). Unfortunately, in a world of overwhelming data and constant uncertainty, Simon’s 
solution has gone overlooked and our gift of choice, once thought of as a position of power, 
is now being handed out to the nearest expert.  
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Research by Herman Kahn and Irwin Mann on the common pitfalls of analysis also 
explore the dangers of blind reliance of experts. In their 1957 research memorandum, they 
study the mistake entitled “butch.” Butch is a “the completely mistaken technical notion or 
fact” (Kahn & Mann, 1957). What they mean is that when studying on a diverse problem 
is will be necessary to work with a large number of experts from diverse fields. They 
recommend that “it is crucial in dealing with these experts not to accept their statements 
uncritically, not matter how scholarly or distinguished they are (Kahn & Mann, 1957). 
Kahn & Mann recommend that analysts fight this issue in two ways. First, become a lay 
expert in all relevant fields, this working knowledge will allow you to ask meaningful 
questions and detect assumptions from experts. Second, they should solicit as many experts 
as possible to get a variety of perspectives. 
Supporting this notion of being more mission-orientated, Mansharamani references 
Nobel Laurate Robert Merton and his research on goals-based investing. Merton argues for 
shift in focus - away from exploiting and toward the possibility of succeeding. To put this 
in military terms, Merton focus is not on winning battles (short term victories), but winning 
the war (long term goal). This mission-orientated thinking is synonymous with the Marine 
Corps’ utilization of commander’s intent to effectively execute “decentralized command” 
(a key factor of MW).  
Mansharamani utilizes the theory of the Peter Principle, developed by Dr. Laurance 
J. Peter and Raymond Hull in 1969, to highlight the bureaucratic focus on organization 
systems and not employee development. The Peter Principle dynamic states that 
individuals rarely get promoted to the job they are capable of, but more often past it (to 
their “level of incompetence.” The reasoning is that those in charge of promotions focus 
too much on the current success of one’s actions and not the future potential and their 
ability to adapt at a higher level. Consequently, employees only develop skills that make 
them effective in their current situation and negate expanding their breadth of 
understanding. This idea of blindly following protocols is very indicative of the promotion 
and command selection boards currently utilized within the Marine Corps because it 
focuses on tangible outputs like MOS credibility and neglects the development of 
interdisciplinary thinking. 
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Finally, Mansharamani address the unintended consequences of operating within a 
system. A system is connection of multiple parts that includes feedback loops to drive 
change. Unfortunately, specialists only operate in a narrow silo and therefore see change 
from the outside as an unintended consequence. Alternatively, generalists operate as a 
system and only see consequences of actions. An example of this phenomenon is the 
adoption of the seatbelt. People traditionally believe that wearing seatbelts make us safer, 
but what if they don’t?  What if they make you feel safer and therefore you drive recklessly? 
This extreme focus can actually worsen and magnify unintended consequences. For 
example, countless safety mechanisms have allowed our problems to pile up, making us 
over confident, and extremely vulnerable to massive disasters. This is explained by Hyman 
Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis which argues that “periods of stability generate 
instability, as it incentivizes actors to take on greater and greater risk as they remain 
oblivious to mounting vulnerabilities” (Mansharamani, 2020).  
Mansharamani argues that we need to realize that our cognitive bandwidth is a fixed 
quantity and our attention is a scares resource. This theory has been studied by Gerald 
Wilde, a psychology professor at Queen’s University, and termed risk homeostasis. His 
theory emphasizes that any decrease in obvious risk for an action will result in people 
continuing to push the boundaries and exceed set limits. Putting blind faith in advances of 
technology also increases focus. By doing this, we are increasing the outsourcing of data 
analysis and not being critical of the results being pushed back. This matters to the Marine 
Corps because it too is an organization of balanced systems and interconnected parts. While 
it is useful to have specialists that understand individual elements well, it is also critical 
that leaders look across domains. By focusing deeply in a singular system, we often fail to 
see how our actions may exacerbate the very complications we are attempting to mitigate. 
So, what are the characteristics of leaders that will be required to facilitate 
innovation and success in the future environment of warfare? In my qualitative analysis, I 
explore the mismatch of industrial learning, in PME courses against the future of 
informational learning in ill-defined warfare. Further, I explore how outsourcing to experts 
has caused an atrophy in our leaders’ ability to think innovatively, placing the Marine 
Corps in a position of being more vulnerable to risks and more uncomfortable in a world 
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of uncertainty. We must always remember to keep an open mind with regard to thinking. 
In Herman Kahn’s article “In Defense of Thinking” he explores the difficulty of expanding 
our minds to counter systemic issues. While Kahn uses examples of slavery and mental 
illness to drive home his point about “social inhibitions that reinforce natural tendencies to 
avoid thinking about unpleasant subject” (Kahn, 1962), I ask we open the dialogue to 
explore the mismatches of specialists and generalists when exploring the effectiveness of 
21st century leaders. Kahn concluded his article by stating, “it is quite clear that technical 
details are not the only important operative facts. Human and moral factors must always 
be considered” (Kahn, 1962). This is one reason why this thesis has been broken into two 
parts (quantitative and qualitative). War is not a dichotomy of art or science, but a delicate 
balance that requires a careful synthesis of data, organizational behavior, and strategy to 




8 FMFM 1 Warfighting distinguishes that “while founded on the laws of science, war demands, 
ultimately, the intuition and creativity of art” (Department of the Navy, 1989). LtGen. Paul Van Riper 
(USMC, Ret.) has also stated that “the art of war is clearly the most important. It’s science in support of the 
art…The art is the thinking. It’s understanding the theory and the nature…The science is represented by the 
weapons” (Willis, 2003). 
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. FY15-FY19 LTCOL CSB DATA 
1. Data Description 
The quantitative portion of my thesis focuses on determining if attending a PME or 
Non-PME course effects selection on the LtCol CSB. I analyzed data previously used in 
the 2019 NPS thesis by Alissa Tarsiuk. The data set includes individual level data on 1,691 
active-duty Marine Corps Officers who were eligible to be screened on the LtCol CSB 
from FY15 to FY19 (a total of 2,838 observations because non-selected Marines can be 
screened on multiple FY boards). Table 1 shows the mean descriptive statistics for Marines 
screened the LtCol CSB from FY15 to FY19. 
Table 1. Eligible CSB Officer’s Descriptive Statistics Summary (FY15-
FY19) 
Demographics Summary FY2015-FY2019) 





Primary MOS  
Combat Service Support 0.423 
Aviation 0.321 
Combat Arms 0.256 
Experience  
Time in Service (years) 20.130 
Combat Deployments 3.529 







Demographics Summary FY2015-FY2019) 




PFT 1st Class 0.895 
PFT Other 0.105 
CFT 1st Class 0.894 
CFT Other 0.106 
Rifle Expert 0.769 
Rifle Other 0.231 
Pistol Expert 0.649 
Pistol Other 0.351 
Education  
Captain PME 0.328 
Captain non-PME 0.067 
Major PME 0.375 
Major non-PME 0.074 
Performance  
Captain RS Cum RelVal 91.437 
Captain RS Cum RelVal 92.476 
 
The data was originally collected from TFDW and MMRP-30. TFDW provided 
variables that covered training, education, demographics, and experience. These variables 
are a snapshot in time and reflect what the board members saw when voting on potential 
commanders. MMRP-30 is responsible for the processing and cataloging of all fitness 
report data created in the Marine Corps. They provided fitness report data which allowed 
me to create average cumulative relative Reporting Senior (RS) values for the rank of 
captain, major and LtCol commanders. This allowed me to give my models a performance 
variable that voting board members saw when assessing potential commanders. A notable 
limitation to this data is that it does not contain the data of Marines who self-selected out 
of the CSB through the process called “remove by request” (RBR). This process is a non-
retribution way of eligible officers to remove themselves from consideration for command. 
There is currently limited data capturing the number of RBRs and reasons for self-removal. 
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2. Methodology 
In this thesis, I conduct a quantitative analysis of the FY15 to FY19 CSB through 
the use of a multivariate regression analysis to attempt to explain the effect of MOS 
credibility (through attending a GEP) on selection on the CSB. The GEP career path is 
broken into four variables; captain and major PME (O-3 and O-4 level resident and 
foreign PME attendance) and captain and major Non-PME (resident GEPs, International 
Affairs Programs, Olmsted Scholar Program, training with industry and fellowships 
removing Marines from their primary MOS for an extended period of time). I then 
estimate probit models to predict CSB selection by controlling for various predictors 
(gender, deployments, fitness report performance, time in service, etc.). Then, I 
construct an odds ratio to determine if there is a statistical difference in LtCol command 
selection based on a Marine attending a PME or non-PME GEP at certain ranks. Finally, 
I examine the performance of selected commanders and use a multivariate regression 
model to determine if GEP attendance does have a statistically relevant effect on fitness 
reports while in command. 
The second method used in this thesis is a qualitative analysis that attempts to 
determine the ideal commander that the Marine Corps should be selecting to operate in 
the 21st century battlefield. This analysis is done through an examination of recent 
literature (books, academic journal articles, and military doctrine) regarding 
interdisciplinary thinking, industrial versus information learning, and wicked versus 
tame environments. 
B. ECONOMETRIC MODELS 
In this thesis, I use three multivariate regression models to better interpret if GEP 
attendance statistically affects CSB selection and if GEP attendance creates higher 
performing commanders. I do this through the use of probit and logit regressions and 
ordinary least squares (OLS). Both models demonstrate how selected variables for 
demographics, training, education, performance, and experience influence the outcome 
of LtCol command selection and their performance markings while in command. These 
models are expressed in more detail in Figures 4 and 6.  
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1. Probit and Logit Regression Models 
Since my thesis focuses on the outcome of whether or not a Marine was selected 
for LtCol command, I decided to use a binary outcome model. The goal of a binary 
outcome model is to explain the effects of predictor variables on the response probability 
of the outcome variable. There are numerous models that can be used for binary outcome 
models: linear probability model (LPM), probit, and logistic. LPM has several 
drawbacks including “fitted probabilities [that] can be less than zero or greater than one 
and the partial effect of any explanatory variable (appearing in level form) is constant” 
(Wooldridge, 2013). We can alleviate these issues by utilizing a probit or logistic model. 
Wooldridge describes a probit model as “a model for binary response where the response 
probability is the standard normal cumulative distribution function (CDF) evaluated at 
a linear function of the explanatory variables” (Wooldridge, 2013).  
For this thesis, I build both probit and logistic regression models that explore 
how demographics, training, education, performance, and experience relates to the 
probability of LtCol command selection. Figure 3 displays theoretical probit and logistic 
models, where y is the dependent variable (defined by 1 or 0, as selected for command). 
The coefficients on the independent variables are defined by 𝛽𝛽. In a probit model, 𝐺𝐺 is 
defined as the standard normal CDF, which is represented by an integral where Φ(𝑧𝑧) is 
assumed to be normally distributed. In a logistic model, G is the logistic function that is 
now represented between zero and one (symbolized by z). This value is the CDF for a 
normal logistic random variable. 
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Binary Response Model 
𝑃𝑃(𝑦𝑦 = 1|𝒙𝒙) = 𝐺𝐺(𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥1 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘) = 𝐺𝐺(𝛽𝛽0 + 𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙) 
 
Probit Model 










Figure 3. Probit and Logistic Models. Source: Wooldridge (2013). 
One major drawback to utilizing a probit model is that the coefficients on the 
independent variables can only be used to determine marginal effects and not for 
quantifiable context. I utilized odds ratio to interpret the magnitude of the logit model 
coefficients on the dependent variable. Odds ratios center about the value of 1. If the odds 
ratio is above 1 then the response is more likely to occur for the given factor, relative to 
the baseline. If the odds ratio is less than one then the response is less likely to occur for 
the given factor. The following is the probit and logistic regression models I used in this 
thesis. I control for factors associated with demographics, training, education, 
performance, and experience to determine how these factors influence an officer’s odds of 
being selected for LtCol command.  
 
𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) = 𝐺𝐺(𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1(𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽2(𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷) + 𝛽𝛽2(𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)
+ 𝛽𝛽3(𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) + 𝛽𝛽4(𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)) 
Figure 4. Thesis Probit and Logistic Model 
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2. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Model 
Wooldridge states that OLS models are “a method for estimating the parameters of 
a multiple linear regression model. The ordinary least squares estimates are obtained by 
minimizing the sum of the squared residuals” (Wooldridge, 2013). 
 
𝑌𝑌 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥2 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 + 𝐸𝐸 
Figure 5. OLS Model. Source: Wooldridge (2013) 
In this thesis, I use an OLS model to estimate the relationship between GEP 
attendance and a primary selected LtCol’s performance while in a command billet.  
 
𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1(𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆_𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸) + 𝛽𝛽2(𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸) + 
𝛽𝛽3(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚_𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸)+𝛽𝛽4(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸) + 𝛽𝛽5(𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖) 
Figure 6. Thesis OLS Model 
In my OLS model, I am concerned with the coefficient on Non-PME (𝛽𝛽2) because 
it represents the relationship between a commander’s attendance of a non-PME course and 
how that officer performed while in a command role. If there is a statistically significant 
relationship between the two variables, I expect a negative value on 𝛽𝛽2 and 𝛽𝛽4 because the 
assumption is that Marines with decreased MOS credibility make less effective 
commanders. 
C. VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
1. Dependent Variables 
There are two dependent variables that I am concerned with in this thesis: LtCol 
command selection and LtCol command performance. LtCol command selection is a 
binary variable and LtCol command performance is a continuous variable. Table 2 lists the 
two dependent variables utilized in this thesis, followed by a narrative of each dependent 
variable. 
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Table 2. List of Dependent Variables 
Dependent Variables 
Selection Outcome  
Variable Name Variable Value 
CSB_selection 
= 1 if Officer selected as Primary, = 0 
Otherwise 
  
LtCol Command Performance  
Variable Name Variable Value 
LTCOL_CMD_RS_RELVAL_CUM 
Average FITREP RS Cumulative Value while 
in LtCol Command 
 
LtCol Command Selection. This variable reflects whether an officer was selected 
for LtCol command or not. MMOA-3 compiled the data of which officers were selected as 
primary, alternate, or non-selection for LtCol command. Figure 7 visualizes the outcome 
of the CSB across FYs and highlights a consistent number of primary and alternate 
selections. 
LtCol Command Performance. This is a continuous variable that represents the 
average Reporting Senior (RS) cumulative value of each selected commanding officer’s 
FITREP while serving in LtCol command. I utilized FITREP data, obtained from MMRP-
30, for all officers screened for command from FY15-FY19. By filtering billet description 
and unit description, I removed all FITREPs that did not identify as belonging to 
commanding officers. I then calculated the mean RS cumulative values to use as a 
command performance variable in this thesis. 
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Figure 7. CSB Outcome by Selection Status (FY15-FY19) 
2. Independent Variables 
There are numerous independent variables that I am concerned with in this thesis 
that cover the subjects of demographics, training, education, performance, and experience. 
These variables are a mixture of binary and continuous. Table 3 lists the independent 
variables utilized in this thesis, followed by a narrative of each independent variable. 
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Table 3. List of Independent Variables 
Independent Variables 
Fiscal Year Board  
Variable Name Variable Value 
FY15  = 1 if board took place in FY2015, = 0 if otherwise 
FY16  = 1 if board took place in FY2016, = 0 if otherwise 
FY17  = 1 if board took place in FY2017, = 0 if otherwise 
FY18  = 1 if board took place in FY2018, = 0 if otherwise 
FY19  = 1 if board took place in FY2019, = 0 if otherwise 
Demographics  
Variable Name Variable Value 
Major  = 1 if eligible officer is a major, = 0 if LtCol 
Female  = 1 if eligible officer is female, = 0 if male 
White  = 1 if eligible officer is white, = 0 if non-white 
Primary MOS  
Variable Name Variable Value 
Combat Service 
Support  = 1 if eligible officer has CSS PMOS, = 0 if otherwise 
Aviation  = 1 if eligible officer has aviation PMOS, = 0 if otherwise 
Combat Arms  = 1 if eligible officer is combat arms PMOS, = 0 if otherwise 
Experience  
Variable Name Variable Value 
Time in Service (years) Eligible officer’s time in service 
Combat Deployments Eligible officer’s number of combat deployments 
Non-Combat 
Deployments Eligible officer’s number of non-combat deployments 
Training  
Variable Name Variable Value 
PFT 1st Class  = 1 if eligible officer has 1st Class PFT, = 0 if otherwise 
CFT 1st Class  = 1 if eligible officer has 1st Class CFT, = 0 if otherwise 
Rifle Expert  = 1 if eligible officer has rifle expert, = 0 if otherwise 
Pistol Expert  = 1 if eligible officer has pistol expert, = 0 if otherwise 
Education  
Variable Name Variable Value 
Captain PME 
 = 1 if eligible officer attended PME course as a Captain, = 0 if 
otherwise 
Captain non-PME 





 = 1 if eligible officer attended PME course as a Major, = 0 if 
otherwise 
Major non-PME 
 = 1 if eligible officer attended non-PME course as a Major, = 0 
if otherwise 
Performance  
Variable Name Variable Value 
Captain RS Cum 
RelVal 
Eligible officer’s Average FITREP RS Cumulative Value as a 
Captain 
Captain RS Cum 
RelVal 
Eligible officer’s Average FITREP RS Cumulative Value as a 
Major 
 
Demographics. These variables were created using the data from TFDW. I created 
variables for gender (female), race (white), and rank (major) representative of the time they 
were screened on the CSB.  
Training. These variables were created using the data from TFDW. I created 
variables for, 1st Class Physical Fitness Test (PFT) and Combat Fitness Test (CFT), and 
expert rifle and pistol scores representative of the time they were screened on the CSB.  
Education. These variables were created using the data from TFDW and MMRP-
30. I created variables for non-PME (at both captain and major ranks), if they attended a 
resident GEP course (NPS or AFIT), international affairs program, Olmsted Scholar 
Program, fellowships, or training with industry, verified with additional military 
occupational specialties (AMOS) and academic FITREP data. I also created variables (at 
both captain and major rank) for PME, if they attended a resident or foreign PME courses 
(CSC, Naval War College, international CSCs, etc.) verified with AMOS and academic 
FITREP data (Headquarters Marine Corps, 2019b). Figure 8 visualizes the trends of 
primary CSB selection across FYs and broken down by GEP attendance. It is interesting 
to note the consistent low selection rates for Non-PME attendees and the fluctuation of 
PME attendance. 
Performance. These variables were created using the FITREP data from MMRP-
30. I calculated the mean RS cumulative values for every officer at the ranks of Captain 
and Major. I chose to only evaluate FITREP data at these ranks because they are most 
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influential when assessing recent command potential and did not include LtCol FITREPs 
because a majority of the officers being screened have not received LtCol FITREP (due to 
being recently selected for LtCol, but not yet promoted to that rank). 
Experience. These variables were created using the data from TFDW. I created 
variables for years of service, non-combat deployments, and combat deployments 
representative of the time they were screened on the CSB.  
 
 
Figure 8. Trend in CSB Selection by GEP (FY15-FY19) 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
A. EFFECT OF PME VS. NON-PME 
1. Deriving the Models 
In this thesis, I aim to reproduce the data used by the CSB members in making their 
selections. To do this, I included data representing demographics, training, education, 
performance, and experience. Performance variables were created using FITREP data, 
which is a continually debated issue. Some believe that RS values are more accurate of a 
Marine’s performance because they represent the direct supervisor’s assessment of the 
Marine reported on (MRO). The reviewing officer (RO) is the supervisor of the RS and 
thus has less direct contact and observation of the MRO. 
I chose the cumulative score (relative values [RV]) because it reflects how a 
Marine’s FITREP score holds up over time (how much it increases or decreases as the RS 
evaluates more Marines at the same rank). I use relative values because it more readily 
provides an apple-to-apples comparison across MROs, whereas RO markings lack this 
normalization. Additionally, RO evaluations are calculated differently than RS evaluations. 
RO evaluations reflect how far a Marine is above or below the RO’s average score which 
makes it less sensitive to variability than RS scores (Stolzenberg, 2017). Additionally, the 
PES manual states that “the only purpose of relative value, by design, is to give individuals 
making personnel management decisions the ability to weigh the merit of a single fitness 
report in relations to the RS’s rating history or ‘profile’” (Headquarters Marine Corps, 
2018). Regarding the RO relative values, the PES manual does not emphasize the values 
like it does for RS values, possibly because RO values are less subjective. 
Finally, in Tarsiuk (2019), she utilized the statistical software package JMP in Stata 
to analyze the selection outcomes using the RS and RO FITREP data. She reported that 
“there is no difference in the outcomes in using RS cumulative or RO cumulative values” 
(Tarsiuk, 2019). When observing the FITREP profile shapes she also noticed that no 
difference was seen, indicating that most of the officers screened on the CSB were already 
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high performers. From this historical analysis I chose to utilize RS cumulative values for 
captain and major in my analysis as performance variables. 
2. The Quantitative Analysis 
(1) Does the Selection for Command outcome differ, if at all, for Marines who 
participate in PME and non-PME GEPs? 
Table 4 displays the marginal effects of the independent variables chosen for this 
model against the binary dependent variable of selection for LtCol command. I chose to 
run a probit model (using marginal effects) because the goodness of fit tests for both the 
probit and logit models and probit were very similar (81.18% vs. 81.32%). It is very 
interesting to note that Major PME remain statistically significant (at the 0.01 level) even 
with the addition of other variables. From Table 4 we see the coefficient on Maj PME 
(.054) is interpreted as attending a resident PME school (at the O-4 level) increases the 
probability of CSB selection by 5.4ppts. Conversely, Maj Non-PME is also significant (at 
the 0.001 level) with all variables, but the coefficient is -0.141. This is interpreted as 
attending a non-PME school (at the O-4 level) decreases the probability of CSB selection 
by 14.1ppts. This is in line with my hypothesis that attending a non-PME course decreases 
MOS credibility and negatively affects command selection potential. It is interesting to 
note that neither the Captain PME or Captain Non-PME variables are statistically 
significant. An explanation for could be that these Marines are young enough in their career 
that their MOS credibility has not been solidified and attendance of these courses do not 
affect their chances of command selection. 
An important variable that is not only statistically significant (at the 0.001 level), 
but that also has the greatest marginal effects is Major. This variable has a coefficient of 
0.081 which can be interpreted as holding the rank of major while being screened for 
command increases the probability of CSB selection by 8.1ppts. This is consistent with 
previous research that shows a positive effect (using odds ratio) of major on command 
selection (Tarsiuk, 2019). An explanation for this affect could be that board members view 
newly selected LtCols as the next generation of commanders and therefore, place a higher 
premium on Marines holding this rank during board selection. If we combine this 
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observation of Major significance with the observation that Major PME and Major Non-
PME have opposing effects, we can make the conclusion that board member possibly view 
Major Non-PME in a negative light because it is an indicator that these Marines have been 
recently billeted outside their PMOS. They could also assume that they may not have the 
most current knowledge of their PMOS and need to be screened on later boards. For Major 
PME, board members might view these Marines as having the most recent knowledge on 
tactics and doctrine, but also having recently operating within their PMOS. They might 
assume that this training makes them more qualified to lead at the LtCol level.  
A surprise in the variables was the significance and coefficients on the performance 
variables for Captain RS Relative Value Cumulative and Major RS Relative Value 
Cumulative. I hypothesized that these variables would have negligible marginal effects and 
not be statistically significant because all Marines screened on the CSB board have already 
been selected on the LtCol promotion board and therefore lower performing Marines would 
have been already selected out of the sample. Both RS Relative Value Cumulative (Captain) 
and RS Relative Value Cumulative (Major) turned out to be significant (at the 0.001 level) 
and have coefficient sizes similar to Major PME (4.2ppts and 4.9ppts, respectively). These 
coefficients are not as large as their effect in LtCol promotion boards (Stolzenberg, 2017), 
but they do highlight that the CSB is so competitive that slight variations in FITREP 
performance can affect selection.  
Table 4. Factors as Indicators of LtCol Command Selection (Marginal 
Effects) 


















































































































































































































































      0.049
*** 
(0.003) 
Observations 2838 2838 2838 2838 2838 2838 2838 
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Now that significant variables have been identified it is important to understand if 
these variables are still significant across different FY boards. This is important because 
each board is comprised of different members and the precept (instructions for the board) 
changes every year. I want to see if there could be a bias amongst these five boards in favor 
of PME or non-PME. Again, I ran a probit model (using marginal effects), but this time I 
created variables for each of the five boards (FY15, FY16, etc.). These models allowed me 
to view the marginal effects of the variables across different boards.  
I noticed that only three variables remained statistically significant (at least 0.05 
level) across all boards. The other variables were only significant during a few boards and 
their coefficients during those boards were extremely different from the other boards. This 
indicates to me that there is a disparity amongst the boards concerning important traits. I 
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looked through the precepts and out briefs from these five boards and there was no 
indication of any change in policy or instructions that would cause this fluctuation in 
variable significance. The only assumption I can make is there is personal bias within the 
board members on the importance of these variables.  
What this model shows is attending a non-PME school at the O-4 level is highly 
significant and decreases the chances of CSB selection regardless of the FY. We can also 
interpret that performance (interpreted from FITREP values) is also a significant influence 
of LtCol command selection and highly regarded by board members. As the Marine Corps 
has begun to implement the CCLEB and CPIB, I hypothesized that non-PME would begin 
to show fewer negative effects, but as shown in Table 5, Major Non-PME is consistent and 
negative. It is interesting to note that Captain Non-PME was positive in two FY boards, 
but this could be because the board does not view Captain Non-PME as detrimental to 
MOS credibility as they do at the O-4 level. 
Table 5. Marginal Effects Across Fiscal Years 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 
Selected for 
Command      






























































































































 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 
Selected for 
Command      
































































Observations 646 546 561 560 525 
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses 
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Next, I ran a logistic regression model (utilizing the same dependent and 
independent variables) so that I conduct an odds ratio analysis for command selection. I 
did this so that I can identify is MOS credibility (PME) has an advantage over non-PME. 
In Table 6, I found that a Marine who graduated from a resident O-4 level PME school is 
1.387 times more likely to be selected on the CSB compared to a Marine who did not 
graduate/attend that type of school (this was significant at the 0.01 level). Additionally, 
attending a resident non-PME school as a major, lowers the odds of CSB selection by 0.318 
to 1 (or 32 to 100). This is consistent with the data collected in Tables 1 and 3 regarding 
the marginal effects of these variables on CSB selection. The odds ratio for these variables 
on the rank of captain are not as significant, but do follow the trend (Figure 9) of the 
variables for major (attending a resident PME school increase chance of selection, while 
attending non-PME schools decreases chance of selection).  
Numerous other variables were statistically significant in effecting the odds of 
being selected, but again the variable, Major, was not only significant at the 0.001 level, 
but also has an odds ratio of 1.643. Additionally, the variables for RS Relative Value 
Cumulative (Captain) and RS Relative Value Cumulative (Major) continued to be 
significant (at the 0.001 level) and have odds ratios of 1.299 and 1.358, respectively. This 
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is consistent with the data collected in Tables 4 and 5 regarding the marginal effects of 
these variables on CSB selection. 
Table 6. Odds Ratio of LtCol CSB Selection (FY2015-2019) 
 (1) 
 Selected for Command 
Captain PME 1.256 (0.151) 













Female 1.441 (0.367) 
White 1.194 (0.177) 








PFT 1st Class 2.107
*** 
(0.438) 
CFT 1st Class 1.719
** 
(0.330) 
Pistol Expert 1.231 (0.139) 
Rifle Expert 1.136 (0.146) 
RS Relative Value Cumulative (Captain) 1.299
*** 
(0.028) 




Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 




Figure 9. Odds Ratio Visual of LtCol Command Selection 
(2) Does LtCol Command Performance differ, if at all, for Marines who 
participate in PME and non-PME GEPs? 
In order to determine if there is a correlation between GEP attendance (time and 
type) and performance while in command, I build a standard OLS model. For this model I 
used the same independent variable from previous probit and logistic models, but the 
dependent variable is now LtCol Command Performance (measured by a Marine’s average 
FITREP RS cumulative value while in LtCol command). 
Table 7 displays the output from the regression of these variables on command 
performance. What is fascinating about these outputs is that there are only two variables 
that are significant. RS Relative Value Cumulative (Major) is statistically significant (at the 
0.001 level), which is consistent with previous research that indicated that performance in 
the grade of major positively affects LtCol command performance (Tarsiuk, 2019). Combat 
Service MOS is statistically significant (at the 0.05 level) and my hypothesis for this 
variable being a significant contributor to command performance is the breadth of the 
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billets available to Marines with this MOS. Marines with a combat service MOS are 
typically able to move throughout the MAGTF and gain experience not available for 
combat arms and aviation MOS (which are more specialized and have a stricter career 
path). The lack of any other independent variable being statistically significant indicates 
that attending a PME or non-PME course (regardless of timing in a Marines’ career) does 
not affect their performance while in LtCol command. 
This observation, does go against my hypothesis that non-PME courses develop 
more effective (and therefore higher performing) leaders, but I believe this can be 
explained by timing. The data for these commanders includes the withdraw from Iraq and 
Afghanistan and action in Syria. What these commanders have not had to face is the next 
battlefield 21st commanders will have to fight on. Instead, these commanders were 
evaluated on their performance of supply detachments of Marines or operating in a familiar 
counter-insurgency environment. 
Table 7. Relationship Between LtCol Command Performance and GEP 
Attendance (FY15-FY19) 
 (1) 
 LtCol Command Performance 
Captain PME 1.145 (0.563) 
Captain Non-PME 0.199 (0.189) 
Major PME 1.554 (0.691) 
Major Non-PME 0.595 (0.739) 
Non-Combat Deployments 0.917 (0.244) 
Combat Deployments 0.946 (0.099) 
Female 0.192 (0.222) 
White 1.479 (0.998) 
Combat Service MOS 3.121
* 
(1.757) 
Aviation MOS 1.762 (1.033) 
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 (1) 
 LtCol Command Performance 
Years of Service 0.991 (0.069) 
Major 2.008 (0.988) 
PFT 1st Class 1.055 (1.098) 
CFT 1st Class 1.495 (1.375) 
Pistol Expert 2.239 (1.050) 
Rifle Expert 1.564 (0.821) 
RS Relative Value Cumulative (Captain) 1.131 (0.102) 





Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
B. GENERALIST VS. SPECIALISTS 
The Marine Corps has always prided itself on producing innovative and 
adaptable thinkers, planners, and warfighters. This does not occur 
automatically or by chance, however. Rather, it results from regular re-
evaluation and reform of training and education institutions, personnel, and 
curricula to ensure they remain at the cutting edge of military thought and 
learning technique.  
—Senate Armed Service Committee (2020) 
Since assuming his role as Commandant, General Berger has stressed the issue of 
operational readiness and developing a Marine Corps that will be relevant and lethal in 
future wars. In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee 
on Readiness and Management Support on Marine Corps Readiness, General Berger goes 
on to recommend that an “expansion of active adult learning techniques and the provision 
of as many opportunities as possible for students to make tactical and operational decisions 
in environments that realistically approximate those, they may face in today’s rapidly 
41 
changing world” (Senate Armed Services Committee, 2020) are essential re-informing and 
re-invigorating learning throughout the Marine Corps. 
In this Chapter I conduct a qualitative analysis of two types of leaders, specialists 
and generalists. I analyze these leaders through their ability to learn, operate through 
various environments, and their leadership effects (Table 8). I then synthesize these 
observations to better recommend the type of leader that will be best suited for command 
in 21st century warfare.  
Table 8. Specialist vs. Generalist Commander Characteristics9 
Specialist Generalist 
Training (what to think) Education (how to think) 
Block Learning (repetition) Interleaved Learning (connections) 
Current PME (industrial) Future PME10 (informational) 
Tame Environments (multiple answers) Wicked Environments (no “right” answer) 
Zero-Defect (stagnant) Free Play (innovation) 
Analyze (destruction11) Synthesize (creation) 
Echo Chambers (groupthink) Respectful Dissent (devil’s advocate) 
Depth (hedgehog) Breadth (fox) 
MOS Credibility (be somebody12) Interdisciplinary Thinker (do something) 
 
9 This table was developed through the synthesis of various research and articles regarding MW, 
leadership, strategic thinking, thinking critically, and education reform. Each comparison is explored in the 
context of leadership potential and 21st century warfare. 
10 The 38th CPG specifically highlights that “we must change the Training and Education Continuum 
from an industrial age model, to an information age model” and “we have to enable them to think critically, 
recognize when change is needed and inculcate a bias for action without waiting to be told what to do” 
(Office of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, 2019). 
11 Destruction and Creation is a 1976 unpublished paper by Colonel John Boyd (USAF, Ret.) that 
details his framework for braking systems in pieces so that they can be reassembled across numerous 
domains to generate flexibility and openness in a wicked world. 
12 “To be somebody or do something” is a quote from Colonel John Boyd (USAF, Ret.) that is meant 
to highlight the systemic careerism that perpetuates in the military. He visualizes a career as two paths, one 
leading to sacrificing self-values to obtain great assignments and promotions (being somebody) and the 
other staying true to yourself, but accepting tough assignments and making an impact for the good of the 
organization (doing something). 
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My attempt is not to negate the impact of specialist training within the Marine 
Corps. Specialists are necessary for organizational efficiency and operating within tame 
environments. Instead, I argue that our Industrial Age learning model, which is currently 
utilized in our PME courses, negatively influences our current ideal of selecting leaders 
which is oppressing our ability to innovate and operate successfully in uncertain 
environments. Additionally, this model is promoting the development of hedgehogs who 
silo their knowledge instead of breeding foxes who seek out multiple perspectives when 
problem-solving. These characteristics are not only inefficient for restoring common sense, 
but develop leaders who stifle any respectful dissent or organizational innovation, leading 
to the current zero defect and stagnant culture of learning within the Marine Corps (Table 
8). Additionally, this Industrial Age model promotes the development leaders who focus 
on deductive reasoning (destruction/analysis), which tends to over simply problems and 
make assumptions based on generalizations. This leads to inflexible decisions that are 
incompatible with a wicked world. In its place, we should be promoting inductive 
reasoning (creation/synthesis), which starts with observations and works backwards toward 
developing a generalization. Synthesis allows for a more flexible type of thinking because 
you start with very specific data and make generalizations that are adaptable to a fluid 
(wicked) environment (Table 8). Finally, we should be developing “soft skills13 that 
nurture familiarity and trust [that] are central to the philosophy of command on which 
maneuver warfare is based” (Augier et al., 2019). 
1. Learning  
The complexity of the modern battlefield and increasing rate of change 
requires a highly educated force. While different, education and training are 
inextricably linked. Education denotes study and intellectual development. 
Training is primarily learning-by-doing. We will not train without the 
presence of education; we must not educate without the complementary 
 
13 Soft skills include “communication, teamwork, and interpersonal skills, critical thinking, and 
problem-solving capability in complex, multidisciplinary situations. These skills are highly generalizable, 
leaders rely on them more heavily than their technical skills, they are more important to an individual’s 
success, and employers place the greatest value on them when making hiring decisions” (Augier et al., 
2019).  
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execution of well-conceived training. (Office of the Commandant of the 
Marine Corps, 2019) 
General Berger hits on the main issue of this chapter, which is that future leaders 
will be more decentralized and dispersed than ever before. To create decision-makers who 
will be able to not only survive but thrive in these environments, we need to focus on 
educating them to be more flexible thinkers. I agree that training is more focused on “what 
to think,” emphasizing checklists, SOPs, and doctrine. Educations is associated with “how 
to think,” which is a richer and more permanent form of learning.  
However, our current PME courses are “firmly based in the ‘lecture, memorize 
facts, regurgitate facts on command’ model of Industrial Age training and education” 
(Office of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, 2019). This current model emphasizes 
block learning which is the process of learning through repetition to reinforce knowledge. 
While this type of learning has its place in the Marine Corps, especially boot camp and 
initial training, it is ill-suited for creating innovative and flexible thinkers. Instead, TECOM 
should be structuring PME courses with interleaved learning, which is understanding 
information through various conditions (Table 8). This method is also known as “learning, 
fast and slow” because it directs students to pair issues with a possible solution, which 
strengthens one’s problem-solving abilities by enabling the use of multiple perspectives. 
This is not a foreign concept to the Marine Corps, the recently released MCDP 7 Learning 
effectively argues against overreliance on technology and promotes utilizing multiple 
outlooks. When discussing the role of learning in warfighting, it highlights that “Marines 
use skills such as critical thinking, reasoning, viewing situations from multiple 
perspectives, and visualizing the battlespace in nonlinear terms to determine the best course 
of action” (Department of the Navy, 2020b). This parallels the concept of self-reflection 
and how approaching a problem from multiple viewpoints is essential to fighting biases 
and the blind outsourcing to experts; a skill that quickly atrophies when not regularly 
exercised.  
The interaction between training and education is a constant feedback loop that 
drives innovation and success (Figure 10). Training is an essential building block for which 
we begin to develop leaders. From this foundation, a skillset of knowledge is developed. 
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Then a more expansive education element can be developed where environments are 
adjusted and interdisciplinary thinking can be nurtured. Mortimer Adler14 describes this as 
the difference between learning by instruction and learning by discovery. He states that “to 
be informed is to know simply that something is the case. To be enlightened is to know, in 
addition, what it is all about: why it is the case, what its connections are with other facts, 
in what respects it is the same, in what respects it is different, and so forth” (Adler & Van 
Doren, 1972). This informational education drives a deeper understanding which in turn 
can be leveraged to update and streamline training. This constant orientation and evaluation 
of the interactions between training and education are not only necessary to develop 
generalist thinkers of the future, but also to ensure that primary training is relevant and 
efficient.  
 
Figure 10. Feedback Loop of Training and Education 
 
14 Mortimer Adler was a philosopher and educator whose research focused on the methods and 
techniques used to educate and learn. He is widely known for his works: How to Read a Book, Reforming 
Education, and Invitation to the Pain of Learning (claiming that learning is a painful, but necessary 
process). 
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The main issue with modeling our current PME courses in an industrial model is 
that we are knowingly producing specialists (Figure 11). By projecting “solutions” to 
problems and promoting doctrine as the model in which every issue should be addressed, 
we are stifling innovation and narrowing the perspectives of future leaders. By creating 
specialists, we are also instilling overconfidence which will eventually backfire when they 
are “fooled by experience” (Epstein, 2019). This concept refers to specialists and their 
tendencies to view the world through their domain (or system) and fail to observe problems 
from other perspectives. This causes specialists to bury deeper and deeper into their system 
when trying to force a solution to a problem that may not be possible to solve within that 
one system. The opposite is an interdisciplinary thinker who knows many little things and 
is constantly collecting perspectives to add to their intellectual range. These integrators 
also personify objectiveness though self-awareness that their positions as theories that 
require further exploration (they encourage others to help them challenge their 
perceptions). They also have a high level of personal curiosity because they chose to 
investigate new perspectives, regardless of their own self predispositions. In ill-defined 
domains that are full of uncertainty, experience alone is incapable of improving 
performance. Successful behaviors of relearning are more essential, and they can be 
developed by dissecting views in search of lessons to update their beliefs (i.e., learning). 
John Boyd15 addresses the issue of specialists in his unpublished paper, 
“Destruction and Creation.” Boyd argues that “to comprehend and cope with our 
environment we develop mental patterns or concepts of meaning” (Boyd, 1976). To be able 
to survive in a disparate world we need to be able to increase our ability to innovate by 
continually destroying these patterns to create new ones that fit the environment (Figure 
8). To do this Boyd first demonstrates from Gödel’s 1931 Proof, that we cannot 
demonstrate the consistency of a system within itself. This means that we have to go outside 
a system to prove that a domain is consistent. Next, through Heisenberg’s 1927 
 
15 Colonel John Boyd (USAF, Ret.) was a fighter pilot and military strategist. He is known for his 
“OODA Loop” (continually adjusting perspectives to out-cycle the enemy) and aiding the Marine Corps in 
adopting MW. He is less known for his discussions regarding the “Conceptual Spiral” and “Destruction and 
Creation.” These later works highlight Boyd’s desire to provide a rational framework for his ideas on 
combat and conflict. 
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Indeterminacy Principle, that you cannot simultaneously determine the location and 
velocity of a particle, he denotes that as you become more and more specialize in an area, 
the uncertainty in your ability to think increases exponentially. Finally, he references the 
second law of thermodynamics, all observed natural process generate entropy, to support 
that the world is ill-defined because confusion and disorder (entropy) are continually being 
generated; if it was not there would be no innovation because we would all be satisfied 
with the status quo. Therefore, if we try and solve ill-defined problems within the system, 
we will continually generate mass entropy (uncertainty) and become ever more confused 
and disorientated. Boyd concludes that “when acting within a rigid or essentially a closed 
system, the goal-seeking effort of individuals and societies to improve their capacity for 
independent action tends to produce disorder towards randomness and death” (Boyd, 
1976).  
Former Marine Corps University (MCU) President, LtGen. Paul Van Riper 
(USMC, Ret.), outlined his thoughts on the education of strategic thinkers in various 
environment in his 2013 contribution to the U.S. Army Research Institute’s research 
project entitled Exploring Strategic Thinking: Insights to Assess, Develop, and Retain 
Army Strategic Thinkers. LtGen. Van Riper summarizes the differences in three separate 
approaches to decision making: System 1 (analytic), System 2 (intuitive), and System 3 
(systemic) (Augier & Barrett, 2019b). System 1 is merely an involuntary reaction to a 
situation. This can be caused by extensive training to SOPs or immediate obedience to 
orders. System 2 requires metal agility, but relies mostly on pattern recognition. Both 
Systems 1 and 2 are successful characteristics of specialist in tame environments where 
problems are linear and patterns are easily recognizable, but fall short when operating in 
wicked environments; as Herbert Simon said, “intuition is nothing more and nothing less 
than recognition” (Van Riper, 2013). System 3 is what LtGen. Riper personally designed 
to operate and make decisions in a wicked environment. He believes that “the essence of 
this more modern approach to operational design requires a group of people knowledgeable 
about some aspect of an area, enemy, issue and so forth to engage in a discourse as the 
attempt to give form to what appears unstructured” (Van Riper, 2013). While LtGen. Van 
Riper’s definition of the System 3 approach is worded for an organization, its basis is 
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reminiscent of the idea of range and Boyd’s Conceptual Spiral. LtGen. Van Riper, like Col. 
Boyd earlier, emphasizes the awareness that ill-structured or unstructured problems “are 
not subject to intuition or analytical procedures because the pattern is not obvious and 
because a rule-set does not exist for solving them” (Van Riper, 2013). What he is inferring 
is that when making decisions in a wicked world interdisciplinary thought must be applied 
to generate perspectives that capture the complexities of a non-linear system.  
An alternate and effective philosophy to fight uncertainty and become a more 
effective decision-maker is to utilize Boyd’s “Conceptual Spiral.” The Conceptual Spiral 
is not a checklist, SOP, or doctrine. Like MW, it is a philosophy that facilitates relearning 
and does not become an antiquated step-by-step process. The conceptual spiral calls for the 
observation of mismatches, which is continually looking for a match between our 
orientation (thinking and doing) with the emerging novelty. Novelty is produced through 
analysis (breaking down/destruction) and then synthesis (connecting the dots). It is 
important to remember that orientation is not a state, but a process (it is also the key to 
Boyd’s Observe, Orientate, Decide, Act [OODA] loop because it paints the way each 
person views the world; we are all different). The key philosophy that leaders must obtain 
to be able to utilize the conceptual spiral is to “exploit this whirling (conceptual) spiral of 
orientation, mismatches, analyses/synthesis, reorientation, mismatches, analysis/
synthesis…so that [they] can comprehend, cope with, and shape—as well as be shaped 
by—that world and the novelty that arises out of it” (Boyd, 1992). If we continually force 
Marines to be educated in an Industrial Age model, we are making it harder for them to 
relearn and expand their view, thus creating inflexibly and closed-minded leaders.  
2. Environments 
There are two main types of environments in which decision makers and 
organizations operate, kind and wicked. Psychologist Robin Hogarth explains kind 
environments as places where “patterns repeat over and over, and feedback is extremely 
accurate and usually very rapid” (Epstein, 2019). Problems here are confined to a single 
system and “similar challenges occur repeatedly” (Epstein, 2019). In wicked environments, 
“the rules of the game are often unclear or incomplete, there may or may not be repetitive 
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patterns and they may or may not be obvious, and feedback is often delayed, inaccurate, or 
both” (Epstein, 2019). It is these environments were, since rules are less defined, that 
experts or specialists have biases/assumptions that emphasize the exact wrong lessons 
(Figure 11). 
As General Berger stated in his Planning Guidance, the future battlefield will be 
more wicked than ever before. With the focus on great power competition, space, and grey-
zone conflict penetrating our daily activities, we are significantly vulnerable to information 
overload and paralysis-by-analysis. By specializing our way of learning and thinking, we 
have installed filters to help us focus, but at a significant cost. By filtering issues, we have 
essentially ignored other concerns and possibly missed critical opportunities. The essential 
drawback is that “the depth of our focus is blinding us from the breath of perspective.” 
(Mansharamani, 2020). 
Specialists typically fear the ill-structured environments of the future because they 
have a very narrow perspective in which to make decisions (Figure 11). Instead, we should 
be nurturing the generalist mindset of our future leaders which allows them to embrace the 
uncertainty. Utilizing an interdisciplinary mentality frees commanders to view the future 
as a collection of possibilities and does not tie them down to a prediction. Specialists tend 
to oversimplify the future and try to distill a finite prediction based on their experience. 
This overconfidence only pigeon holes specialist commanders into narrow courses of 
action and filters out possible better perspectives or opportunities. 
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Figure 11. Generalist vs. Specialist in Environments 
Another method in which we can categorize the environments that leaders operate 
within is through the Cynefin framework. The Cynefin framework distinguishes four 
different contexts (environments) in which leaders may operate: simple, complicated, 
complex, and chaotic. This framework was developed because, like John Boyd’s 
“Destruction and Creation” observation, there is a failed assumption in neo-classical 
economic theory and associated textbooks that the world is predictable and orderly. The 
reality is that we operate in a world of disorder and “in the face of greater complexity, 
intuition, intellect, and charisma are no longer enough” (Snowden & Boone, 2007). A 
simple context is a stable and kind environment with a clear cause-and-effect where correct 
answers exist. This domain is safe for automation, rules, and SOPs. A complicated context 
typically contains several right answers, but it is more difficult to comprehend the intricacy. 
This context requires a specialist to aid in the identification and development of a solution 
(otherwise known as generating the dots). A complex context is a vague and wicked 
problem that is ill-defined. This is an environment where generalists are needed to connect 
the dots, not create them. A chaotic context is where searching for the right answers is 
impossible. The interconnections are ever-changing and any analysis is fruitless. In this 
context, the best response of the leader is immediate action to take control, then sense the 
situation, and finally respond. 
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This ability to define the environment in which we are functioning and select an 
approach is what Joseph Nye calls “contextual intelligence” (Nye, 2010). This method 
allows us to generate multiple perspectives and divide complex problems into several 
complicated ones that can be rationally managed. Also, as leaders, we must always be 
asking questions because “the important and difficult job is never to find the right answer. 
It is to find the right questions” (Drucker, 1955). In a world increasingly dominated by 
technology, we must always remember that algorithms and simulations are not immune to 
human error (they were programmed by humans). This idea is highlighted in General 
Berger’s CPG when he states that “we will always focus on people over systems in the 
command and control process per FMFM1. Decisions are what the commander does; 
systems exist only to support the commander’s needs” (Office of the Commandant of the 
Marine Corps, 2019). 
3. Leadership and Decision Making 
Developing fundamental cognitive competencies such as problem framing, 
mental imaging, critical thinking, analysis, synthesis, reasoning, and 
problem-solving enables Marines to make effective decisions more quickly 
in time-constrained operational environments, when they often have 
incomplete, inaccurate, or even contradictory information. (Department of 
the Navy, 2020b) 
This age of information overload had led to an increased need for thinking. Leaders 
are so inundated with data that they knowingly write blank checks to other specialists 
because they believe an “expert opinion” is what the Marine Corps desires. This is an 
understandable assumption since leaders are being promoted and selected for command 
based on MOS creditability (specialization) and they are trained to believe that there is an 
optimal solution to every problem. But in Vikram Mansharamani’s book, Think for 
Yourself: Restoring Common Sense in an Age of Experts and Artificial Intelligence, he 
argues “experts and technologies are useful-indeed essential-but it is the mindless and blind 
outsourcing to them that must be guarded against, that generates unnecessary risks to our 
well-being, and that limits opportunities to realize our true potential” (Mansharamani, 
2020). This outsourcing has caused atrophy in our ability to think and we are now more 
vulnerable to risks and more uncomfortable in a world of uncertainty. 
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To battle this dependence of specialists, we must first relearn what John Boyd 
taught us about solving a system within a system, “we can neither predict the future 
migration and evolution … nor just confine them to any one system nor suggest that they 
fully embrace any such system” (Boyd, 1992). We must encourage our leaders to think 
across domains and free themselves not only from those experts in their command but the 
expert tendencies they have learned throughout their Marine Corps career. As stated by 
Colonel Wyly in “Book on Books,”  
The art of war has no traffic with rules. But if you do not read, you are 
doomed to dwell in a world of rules made by others. Your mind will 
atrophy. Instead of being able to sense what aspects of battle never change 
and what aspects change with conditions, you will have to accept someone 
else’s word as a rule. And because there is no rule in war that works all the 
time, without the ability to sense and adapt, you will eventually lose. (Wyly, 
n.d.) 
By promoting interdisciplinary thinking, we build a leader’s meta knowledge (the 
realization that they do not know anything with 100 percent certainty) and allow them to 
become leaders that enable innovation and success. 
Developing and promoting leaders who embrace and value interdisciplinary 
thinking will also pay dividends to future leaders in their charge. Leaders who develop 
humility and empathy toward generalist thinking tend to percolate that understanding to 
their subordinates through the promotion of respectful dissent and the use of devil’s 
advocate (Murray, 2014). Respectful dissent is difficult to promote by specialist leaders 
because their perspectives are too narrow to comprehend future possibilities. Generalists 
are more adept to exhaust all avenues to ensure that not only is the context and environment 
well understood, but the proposed resolutions are representative of all relevant domains 
(Figure 11). The Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, has gone so far as to state that 
the military is “over-centralized, overly bureaucratic, and overly risk-averse” (Lopez, 
2017). In sync with General Berger, General Milley believes the future of warfare will be 
even more austere, decentralized, and uncomfortable. To survive in this environment, 
General Milley believes that we need to empower our leaders and decentralize decision 
making, to achieve the desired effects. He believes we cannot “micromanage and over-
specify everything a subordinate has to do…that is not an effective way…to fight. Not an 
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effective way to conduct operations. You will lose battles and wars if you approach warfare 
like that” (Lopez, 2017). We must provide our subordinates with “commander’s intent” 
(mission type orders) where the end state is clear, but the method is fluid and adaptable. 
Not only does this generate buy-in and innovation from the Marines, but it opens the 
perspective of the commander to those courses of action generated by their executing units. 
Military leaders have an atrocious track record for predicting the future (even worse 
are the prediction rates by experts). Instead of trying the predict the future, we should 
instead focus on the usefulness of these possibilities in aiding us to think differently. It is 
these new perspectives that allow us to move away from our biases and broaden our view 
of the future (Figure 12). Peter Schwartz explains this concept in his book The Art of the 
Long View by observing, “the end result is not an accurate picture of tomorrow, but better 
decisions about the future” (Schwartz, 1991). If we continue to select leaders who hide 
from uncertainty, we are exposing units to missing critical threats and prime growth 
opportunities. 
 
Figure 12. Utilizing Possibilities vs. Predictions 
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To better understand uncertainty and alternate perspectives, we need to embrace 
our creative curiosity16 through critical, creative, and systems thinking. This tactic is 
essential to connecting the seemingly irrelevant dots (not producing them), which can pay 
dividends in shocking and powerful perceptions. We often believe that creative passion is 
a guilty pleasure that takes away from our effectiveness, but we are doing ourselves harm. 
The pursuit of artistic outlets may generate imagination and breakthroughs. We need to 
embrace the idea of scattering out our thinking by reading fiction, watching movies, and 
pursuing imaginative passions. Most importantly the Marine Corps should apply this 
thinking to the characteristics of future commanders. Instead of following the “golden 
career path,” there may be more value in taking on unfamiliar roles and putting ourselves 
in positions of increased learning. 
MOS credibility is a characteristic that has been preached as the key to promotion 
for as long as I can remember. I agree that knowing your job is critical to advancement, but 
it should not generate a learned dependence or inability to think outside one’s MOS 
domain. Despite the ethical ramifications of the Milgram experiment, it did teach us that 
people in positions of power can make those below them do just about anything. In an age 
of experts, this power of perceived knowledge has caused us to write them blank checks to 
our decision making. In turn, we happily don blinders and feel confident that we left it to 
the experts. However, as leaders, we must remember that our view of the mission is broader 
in scope than those of the experts we are employing. If we blindly accept assumptions from 
experts without self-reflection, we are falling into the expert trap of limitations and 
singular-perspectives. 
4. Conclusion 
There is no argument that specialists are needed for the Marine Corps to be an 
efficient fighting force. When dealing in tame environments or complicated contexts, 
specialists are exceptional at generating dots and providing solutions with a narrow 
 
16 Creative curiosity is a mixture of skill, passion, and self-reflection that pushes individuals to 
maximum effectiveness. While difficult to teach and learn it can be accomplished through life-long 
learning, protection from superiors, and an environment that promotes respectful dissent and risk-tolerance. 
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perspective. However, with the environment of the future battlefield being wicked and ill-
defined, the Marine Corps cannot risk selecting specialist commanders and expect them to 
remain flexible and promote innovation within their units. Generalist commanders will be 
needed not only to self-reflect (viewing experts as creators of dots, not inputs) but also to 
generate a unit cohesion that views failure as an opportunity to learn and respectful dissent 
as a requirement in innovation and decision making (Table 8).  
As John Boyd once said we, as military leaders, can either choose to “be somebody 
or do something” (Gates, 2008). If we continue to educate through an industrial model and 
view specialization as our core source of being, we will forever be slaves to experts and 
our narrow ability to predict the future. General James Mattis warned us of this blind 
reliance when he said, “we have been fighting on this planet for 5,000 years and we should 
take advantage of their experience. ‘Winging it’ and filling body bags as we sort out what 
works reminds us of the moral dictates and the cost of incompetence in our profession. As 
commanders and staff officers, we are coaches and sentries for our units: how can we coach 
anything if we don’t know a hell of a lot more than just [Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures]?” (Ingersoll, 2013). Conversely, if we embrace the “dark path” of being a 
generalist, we open our eyes to possibilities and more importantly generate a culture that 




What have we learned about Marines with “range” and how is it useful in the 
Informational Era? From the qualitative portion of this thesis, we can conclude that attending 
a GEP is not a “career killer” for Marines who want to be LtCol commanders. What is 
important to understand is that the timing of a Marine’s attendance to a GEP is what effects 
their odds of command selection. There is a strong correlation, but we cannot prove the 
causation that board members are viewing recent non-PME graduates as having less MOS 
credibility and therefore need more time in their current rank to establish their own credibility 
before being ready for command. 
We also can conclude that attending a PME or non-PME course does not significantly 
affect a commander’s performance. This is important to highlight because the assumption that 
Marines are not being selected because they recently attended a non-PME GEP is unfounded. 
This finding while beneficial to Marine commanders, does not take into account the future of 
21st century warfare (only previous counter-insurgency experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
Syria). It will be advantageous to track this model though the great power competition with 
China and Russia to determine if advantages for commanders with “range” increase in this 
domain. 
From the qualitative portion of this thesis, we conclude that commanders who are 
educated to embrace interdisciplinary-thinking, respectfully dissent/play devil’s advocate, and 
view failure as an opportunity to learn not only create better problem-solvers, but promote 
and develop more innovative and creative thinkers within their command. As stated by Adler 
in his book Reforming Education: The Opening of the American Mind, “the very best thing 
that our educational institutions can do, so far as general education (not the training of 
specialists), is to afford preparation for continued learning by their students after the leave 
these institutions behind them. That cannot be done unless the skills of learning are cultivated 
in school and unless, in schools and colleges, the students are initiated into the understanding 
of great ideas and issues and are motivated to continue to seek an ever-increasing 
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understanding of them” (Adler, 1990). It is from these conclusions that we offer 
recommendations to aid in the implantation and adoption of “range” to the Marine Corps. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
How do we implement the idea of “range” within Marine Corps commanders? This 
has been done before, as noted in the discussion of Gen. Gray and his efforts to implement 
MW into the Marine Corps. Through his leadership and guidance, the Marine Corps 
“underwent a comprehensive transformation to reemphasize education, including reading and 
learning outside one’s specialty, and building strategic and critical thinking into the 
organization” (Augier & Hughes, 2019). Innovation diffusion focuses around two major 
differences; people and products.17 The philosophy is “if one can better understand how 
innovations diffuse, one can better predict and manage that diffusion” (Gourville, 2005). As 
stated in the introduction, the rebirth of learning and education within the Marine Corps can 
be seen as innovation diffusion of a process. In this section, I provide my personal 
recommendations for driving change by first exploring the difficulties of diffusing 
Informational Age learning. Second, I recommend how recently released MCDPs can be used 
to combat the personal, organization, and bureaucratic inertia that learning and education will 
have to overcome within the Marine Corps. Third, I pose potential future research projects 
that will continue where this thesis leaves off. 
1. Rogers’ Five Factors 
While “hot groups” was one perspective on organizational change, Rogers offers an 
alternate framework to better comprehend innovation diffusion. Compiling 40 years of 
research, communication theorist and sociologist Everett Rogers has found that 49% to 87% 
of the variance of innovation adoption can be explained by five product-based characteristics 
(Rogers, 2003). He argues that by understanding these factors, we can; foresee which 
 
17 Significant research has explored the effects of people differences regarding innovation diffusion. 
For example, the effects of personal, organizational, and bureaucratic inertia on adoption. Less is known 
about the effects of product differences and how to compare and contrast their effects on innovation 
adoption. I emphasize this observation so that we can better explore the differences between industrial and 
informational learning. 
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innovations will be implemented, appropriately develop an innovation to increase the 
probability of implementation, and facilitate adoption with a targeted promotion campaign. 
A longstanding assumption in the world of innovation is that having a great innovation 
guarantees that it will diffuse into the population. This is a common misconception that can 
be observed by the slow adoption of the telephone. Alexander Graham Bell invented the 
telephone in 1876 and it took more than 100 years to reach 90% of American homes. This 
issue of innovation diffusion is linked to the issues that perception is reality. This translates 
that how users view a product, is how it will be judged. To ensure innovation diffusion both 
the actual objective characteristics and those perceived by the end-user need to be managed. 
To do this, Rogers outlined five product-based factors that largely government the rate of 
innovation diffusion: “relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability, and 
observability” (Rogers, 2003). Although Rogers developed this framework for use with 
products, I will use these factors to highlight the challenges associated with the organizational 
change and adoption of learning and education within the Marine Corps as a process.18 
Table 9. Roger’s Five Factors: Industrial vs. Information Process 
Characteristics 
Factor Industrial Era Process Informational Age Process 
Relative 
Advantage 
Status quo and manpower 
allocations 
Increased flexibility and comfort 
with uncertainty. 
Compatibility Rules and regulations  Risk and possible failure 
Complexity SOPs decrease uncertainty in 
tame environments, but not in 
wicked ones 
Interdisciplinary thinking, 
though difficult, decreases 
uncertainty in wicked 
environments 
Trialability PME courses CCLEB and CPIB 
Observability EWS and CSCs CPG, TECOM, and Senior 
Marine Office (NPS) 
 
18 In his book, Reforming Education, Mortimer Alder states that “if we recognize, as we should, that 
genuine learning cannot occur without activity on the part of the learner, then we must also recognize that 
all learning is a process of discovery on the part of the learner” (Adler, 1990). 
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Relative advantage is when the innovation is better than the process is replaces. 
Typically, this is recued costs such as time, effort, or money. However, it is not only 
economic, can be social status or prestige. As relative advantage increases, the rate of 
adoption increases. Normally, this is the most obvious and popular driver of innovation 
diffusion. Thus far, this thesis has focused on the relative advantage of information age 
learning from the perspective of generalists being more adaptable and comfortable with 
uncertainty than those leaders educated in the Industrial Age model. However, we must 
also look that the economic effects of transitioning to an Informational Age learning 
environment. If the Marine Corps is to further invest in non-PME graduate education there 
will be fewer Marines available for deployments and to fill positions in the FMF. 
Additionally, the prestige of “every Marine a rifleman” will have to be adjusted again to 
include education and learning. 
Compatibility is when an innovation exhibits familiar standards and occurrences as 
previous products. This makes for an easier or harder transition from an old method to a 
new innovation because people are familiar with it. As compatibility increases, process 
adoption increases. Unfortunately, Informational Age learning is vastly dissimilar from 
Industrial Age learning. Instead of rules and regulations, we are asking Marines to explore 
their curiosity and take risks that could result in failure. Without the top-down support of 
these new learning environments, Marines will be unwilling to adopt informational 
learning. 
Complexity is when an innovation is difficult to understand or use. As perceived 
complexity increases, rate of process adoption decreases. The method to overcome 
complexity is through education (altering how people perceive the innovation). When it 
comes to education and learning there is the common assumption that the Industrial Age 
method of SOPs and developing experts decreases complexity, but it is in fact the opposite. 
Instead of reducing uncertainty, Industrial Age learning merely focuses Marines’ 
perspectives and makes them unimaginative and even more susceptible to analysis 
paralysis. Alternatively, Informational Age learning opens the aperture of Marine leaders 
and enables them to attack problems using multiple domains. The drawback is the 
innovation diffusion of this future model is more complex in execution. While difficult to 
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understand and implement, this generalist perspective will ironically reduce complexity in 
future commanders. 
Trialability is when an innovation is experimented with on a limited basis, such as 
offering free samples or a limited time trail of a process. This allows for self-discovery and 
dispels apprehension. As trialability increases, rate of product adoption increases. When 
the uncertainty of a process is large, it can be countered with trials. The Marine Corps has 
done an admirable job at enabling the trialability of Informational Age learning. The 
development of the CCLEB and CPIB has generated data and exposed Marines to non-
PME GEPs that they may not have self-selected into. To continue with this trend, the 
Marine Corps should explore the reformatting of Industrial Age PME courses to mirror 
Informational Age non-PME courses like NPS. This will allow Marines, who were 
apprehensive about losing MOS credibility, to still obtain the benefits of range (though in 
a shorter time frame).  
Observability is when innovation usage and impact are visible to others. Individuals 
are then able to see the function or need of something by observing others and this action 
influences them to adopt it. Higher observable usage means higher adoption rates. The 
Senior Marine Office at the NPS has begun increasing the observability of Informational 
Age learning by beginning a media campaign that highlights the opportunities and 
achievements of non-PME graduate education. Additionally, the Marine Corps has begun 
slating GEPs prior to PME schools to ensure officers with potential and prior superior 
performance are prioritized. Conversely, every Marine has to complete their rank-specific 
PME course if they wish to be promoted. As long as Industrial Age learning is emphasized 
in these courses, Informational Age learning will continue to be viewed as an exception 
and not the rule. 
2. Implementation of MCDP 7 and MCDP 1-4 
Now that “process differences” have been determined amongst Industrial and 
Informational Age learning, we can better focus on “people differences” for the diffusion 
of learning in the Marine Corps. Published less than a years ago, MCDP 7 Learning has 
been the Marine Corps first attempt to move away from an Industrial Age model of learning 
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to an Informational Age model of learning. Centered around life-long learning, MCDP 7 
is a powerful tool to begin the conversation of education to Marines of all ranks. Where 
MCDP 7 could be extended is in regards to innovation diffusion. Some senior leaders might 
believe that MCDP 7 is for junior Marines and it is not applicable to aid in their continuous 
learning, but I humbly disagree. If the Marine Corps wants to develop future leaders 
capable of interdisciplinary thought and the ability to nurture respectful dissent and risk-
tolerance, then current leaders should be the main focus of these new MCDPs. Without the 
student-teacher “top-cover” that is generated at the battalion level, an era of relearning and 
developing range is exceedingly difficult.  
For example, look at the Marine Corps’ adoption of MW in the 1980s. While young 
officers, fed-up with failed attrition style warfare from Vietnam, were instrumental in 
sparking curiosity, it was not until General Alfred M. Gray was selected as the 29th 
Commandant of the Marine Corps that Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1 Warfighting 
was written and MW was officially adopted as the warfighting philosophy of the Marine 
Corps. As discussed earlier, General Gray was able to create an environment that nurtured 
“hot groups” in order to combat the organizational inertia of the Marine Corps and 
effectively change its warfighting culture. He effectively “served as the movement’s senior 
patron who supported and protected maneuver warfare from meddling while also testing it 
at some of the most strenuous levels possible short of actual combat” (Augier & Barrett, 
2020). This leadership style not only increased tribality, observability, and relative 
advantage, but also decreased the complexity and eased the compatibility of MW diffusion 
within the Marine Corps. A recent example of this top-cover leadership is Major General 
William Mullen who, as Commanding General of Training and Education Command, 
issued a memorandum authorizing Formal Learning Centers to experiment with new 
learning practices. His intent was to “transition our existing Industrial Age training and 
education continuum to an Informational Age model - one more focused on active, student-
centered adult learning that engenders decision making, adaptiveness, and critical 
thinking” (Mullen, 2019). 
Additionally, MCDP 1-4 Competing was published a few months ago and continues 
to magnify the importance of Informational Age learning. Not a reference publication, its 
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intent is to encourage critical thinking and the position the Marine Corps holds on the world 
stage. This publication introduced the competition continuum and why it is important. The 
competition continuum are the ways in which world players try and achieve relative 
advantage over one another. The intent of this publication is that Marines better understand 
competition and in turn spark their innovative curiosity which generates future relative 
advantages. This publication is a complement to MCDP 7 and should be read by leaders 
prior to attempting to implement MCDP 7 within their units. For example, in the 
“education” section of Competing it states that “it is not enough for Marines to educate 
themselves on war and warfighting alone. Such a narrow focus limits the benefits they can 
give to the Nation” (Department of the Navy, 2020a). It goes on to suggest that “self-
education in social, economic, technological, and other matters beyond military history and 
leadership are essential if Marines are to excel in competition” (Department of the Navy, 
2020a). Without using such language, Competing is implying that developing range within 
Marine Corps leadership is essential to remaining relevant and gaining relative advantages 
on the world stage.  
Both MCDP 7 and MCDP 1-4 are champions for interdisciplinary thought and 
should be read concurrently and discussed at all PME and non-PME education. 
Additionally, we should take note of Herbert Simon’s philosophy regarding problem 
solving; “[the] major emphasis needs to be directed toward extracting, making explicit, and 
practicing problem-solving heuristics - both general heuristics, like means - ends analysis, 
and more specific heuristics, like applying the energy-conservation principle in physics. A 
student’s own learning processes will be enhanced if he understands that a large part of his 
professional skill resides in the ability to recognize rapidly the situational cues that signal 
the appropriateness of particular actions” (Simon, 1980). This guidance further stresses the 
importance of promoting interdisciplinary thought and cognitive recognition of one’s own 
environment when assessing problems and making decisions.  
This implementation is necessary if we are to remain a relevant military in the 21st 
century. In General Mullen’s TECOM Commander’s Guidance he states, “we can no 
longer count a technological edge in the next fight. Instead, we have to hone what the 
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Australian Chief of Defense called the ‘Intellectual Edge’19“ (Mullen, 2018). This 
guidance, which included the task of developing MCDP 7 Learning, also highlights the 
critical importance of informational learning and its effect on MW. In Major General 
Mullen’s June 2020 Gazette Article, he explores a question from our 37th Commandant, 
General Robert Neller, “how do we reinvigorate maneuver warfare?” (Mullen, 2020). He 
goes on to address concerns with our current education system and how continuous 
education is vital to remaining a member of the profession of arms. The irony is that 
without a transformation from industrial to Informational Age learning, MW is difficult if 
not impossible to both understand and reinvigorate. As described in the forward of FMFM 
1 Warfighting, MW is a philosophy, not a checklist, that enables the ability to think 
critically and generate a bias for action. If the Marine Corps wishes to re-emphasize and 
re-indoctrinate Marines in MW, they must implement a learning model that, “is focused on 
active, student centered learning that uses a problem posing methodology where our 
students/trainees are challenged with problems that they tackle as groups in order to learn 
by doing and also from each other” (Mullen, 2018). 
3. Further Research 
I understand that this thesis is limited in scope and establishes a starting point for 
future studies regarding education versus training in talent management. I suggest further 
studies examine how the CCLEB has affected LtCol promotion and CSBs. Unfortunately, 
at this point, there is not enough data to conduct this research. The first CCLEB selectees 
are just now being selected for LtCol and being screened on CSBs. This data will most 
likely be ready for analysis in the next five years. A study that could be conducted currently 
would be a survival analysis of those selected for CCLEB. This would expand our 
knowledge regarding the effects of the CCLEB on perceived career potential. We might be 
able to identify if Marines selected for the CCLEB see themselves as non-competitive and 
leave the Marine Corps.  
 
19 Major General Mick Ryan, Australian Defense Force, is credited with coining the term “intellectual 
edge.” He uses this term to describe the necessary competitive advantage needed for future war and 
strategic competition. This edge is based on the development of a small but proficient land force that 
effectively utilizes the philosophy of the OODA loop to gain advantages in an uncertain environment or 
against a formidable opponent.  
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We might also conduct a survey of the RBR reasons to study if Marines with a non-
PME graduate education do not see themselves as competitive or suitable for command 
and they chose to remove themselves from the LtCol selection pool. It would also be 
interesting to expand the CSB data set to compare pre-2011 CSB factors and determine if 
the policies enacted by the Marine Corps affected the CSBs.  
One final future study would be to use an event study design around 2011 (when 
the CCLEB and CPIB were established) to compare “volunteers” (pre-2011) versus those 
selected to attend NPS through the CCLEB and CPIB. This would be beneficial in 
establishing the Marine Corps’ emphasis on education and the effects GEP policy has had 
on non-PME selection and future potential in the Marine Corps. 
Further qualitative research should explore the conceptual pieces of teaching, 
learning, and developing “range” within the Marine Corps. The goal these courses would 
be to “stimulate curiosity, broaden minds and help develop innovative thinking to 
anticipate future environments of conflict, the attributes of new enemies, and anticipated 
technologies to employ or confound” (Augier & Hughes, 2019). We should also not limit 
these courses to arenas of PME. As outlined earlier, the grassroots movement of MW 
within the Marine Corps was not driven from doctrine, but from hot groups of passionate 
young Marines who wanted to satisfy their creative curiosity. The Marine Corps must 
rediscover these outlets for the development of our future leaders. As Gen. Gray said, “it 
doesn’t cost any money to think” (Otte, 2015). With budget cuts on the immediate horizon, 
we should put our efforts back into brown bag lectures, book clubs, and other venues that 
allow for the honest exchange of ideas that aid in the rebirth of learning within the Marine 
Corps. 
We must remember that refocusing the Marine Corps on education is a wicked 
problem, meaning that it does not include a simple solution within one domain. The method 
for developing range consists of multiple facets, but I believe the following two are critical 
to the Marine Corps’ ability to develop effective leaders in 21st century warfare. First, is 
the education we choose to expose to our Marines. Second, is the structure in which it is 
accomplished. Courses on organizational effectiveness, strategic management, and 
thinking critically are ineffective if continually taught through an Industrial Age learning 
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model. We must complement these interdisciplinary courses with an Informational Age 
learning model that injects uncertainty and chaos, allowing for a deeper understanding. 
Likewise, if we continue to teach System 1 and System 2 thinking, doing so in an 
Information Age learning environment will not develop the leaders we need. 
Finally, it would be beneficial to explore the culture and organizational barriers of 
failure and respectful dissent within the Marine Corps. Countless research has determined 
that organizations typically do not suffer from a lack of innovate people, but rather from 
the structure, systems, and culture within the organization itself (Bennett & Parks, 2015). 
By exposing the benefits of failures and synthesizing the misnomer of respectful dissent, 
we could put the Marine Corps in a stronger position to reform our education models to 
eventually develop and select leaders with range. 
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